Avoidant motivational orientation extends perceptual limits by Chan, K.Q.
PDF hosted at the Radboud Repository of the Radboud University
Nijmegen
 
 
 
 
The following full text is a publisher's version.
 
 
For additional information about this publication click this link.
http://hdl.handle.net/2066/170359
 
 
 
Please be advised that this information was generated on 2017-12-07 and may be subject to
change.
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 2 1
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
090
080
070
060
050
040
030
020
010000350
340
330
320
310
300
290
280
270
260
250
240
230
220
210
200
190 180 170
160
150
140
130
120
110
100
AVOIDANT
MOTIVATIONAL ORIENTATION
EXTENDS PERCEPTUAL
LIMITS
AVOIDANT M
OTIVATIONAL ORIENTATION EXTENDS PERCEPTUAL LIM
ITS                        Kai Qin Chan Kai Qin Chan
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 2 1
-------------------
050
040
030
020
010000350
340
330
320
310
230
220
210
200
190 180 170
160
150
140
130
AVOIDANT
MOTIVATIONAL ORIENTATION
EXTENDS PERCEPTUAL
LIMITS
Kai Qin Chan
14 June 2017
12:30 pm
Aula
Radboud University
Nijmegen
14626-qin-chan-omslag.indd   1 27/04/2017   16:50
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
Avoidant 
motivational 
orientation 
extends 
perceptual limits 
Kai Qin Chan 
 
i 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Printed by: Ridderprint 
Copyright © 2017 Kai Qin Chan 
The research presented in this thesis was funded by the 
Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO Grant 
404-10-078).  
  
ii 
 
 
 
Avoidant motivational 
orientation extends 
perceptual limits 
 
 
Proefschrift ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor 
aan de Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen 
op gezag van de rector magnificus prof. dr. J.H.J.M. van Krieken, 
volgens besluit van het college van decanen 
in het openbaar te verdedigen op 
woensdag 14 juni 2017, 
om 12:30 uur precies 
 
door 
 
Kai Qin Chan 
geboren op 18 mei 1984 
te Singapore 
iii 
 
Promotoren: 
Prof. dr. Rob W. Holland  
Prof. dr. Ad F. M. van Knippenberg 
 
Manuscriptcommissie: 
Prof. dr. Karin Roelofs 
Prof. dr. Ap J. Dijksterhuis 
Dr. Joshua M. Tybur (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam) 
 
Paranimfen: 
Dr. Maikel Hengstler 
Shin Pei Gayl Teo 
 
  
iv 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 Preface i 
   
Chapter 1 Do Avoidant Emotions Extend Perceptual 
Limits? 
1 
   
Chapter 2 Fear And Disgust Lower Olfactory 
Threshold 
41 
   
Chapter 3 Disgust Lowers Olfactory Threshold, But 
Does Scent Valence Matter?  
73 
   
Chapter 4 Vigilance in Hearing: Avoidance 
Motivation Orientation Lowers Auditory 
Thresholds 
91 
   
 References 129 
 English summary 159 
 Nederlandse samenvatting  163 
 Acknowledgements 167 
 Biography 168 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“Now you see it, now you don’t.”
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PREFACE 
 
Hold this page one arm’s length from you and then take a look at 
Figure (i). How many circles can you see? Most people will have no 
problems seeing the first six, but they might miss the seventh, eighth, 
and ninth. 
 
● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Figure (i). Circles in decreasing contrast from 1 (darkest) to 9 (faintest). 
 
Human sensory systems are well-adapted to detect things 
within our ecological niche. Being able to detect contrast differences 
from the first seven circles is usually sufficient for our daily life. But 
sometimes objects are not always as obvious as we would like them to 
be. On foggy or rainy days, the precipitous curb just outside Basisschool 
de Akker at the junction between Akkerlaan and Veldstraat can be quite 
difficult to see when I am cycling from my house to Radboud University. 
(In fact, I once misjudged where the curb was and crashed into it during 
a rainy evening.) Even the best detection mechanisms—human or 
nonhuman—will have their own limitations, especially when the 
intensity of the target is extremely low. Nevertheless, it is important to 
be able to detect them because they inform us about the state of our 
immediate environment. 
Psychologists studying perceptual abilities (psychophysicists) 
have mainly been concerned with understanding how the structural 
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characteristics of a stimulus influence the perceptual detection 
(Fechner, 1860/1966; Goldstein, 2001; Stevens, 1961, 2002). For a long 
time, except for a brief period in the 1950s during the so-called New 
Look paradigm (Bruner, 1957; Erdelyi, 1963), detection thresholds 
were thought to be immutable from an individual’s motivational or 
emotional states; any evidence that suggested otherwise was perceived 
to have a psychoanalytic sting to it (Bruner, 1992, 2010). Therefore, in 
prominent handbooks in experimental psychology or specialist medical 
textbooks, there has been no mention whether motivation or emotional 
states affect detection thresholds.  
Recently, this view has been challenged by researchers who 
have found that emotions improve contrast sensitivity, spatial 
resolution, and temporal resolution (Bocanegra & Zeelenberg, 2009, 
2011a, 2011b; Bruner, 1957; Phelps, Ling, & Carrasco, 2006; Sherman 
et al., 2012). However, these studies focused only on vision; whether 
these effects extend to other sensory modalities is yet unknown. A 
science about “(e)motivational psychophysics” would be incomplete if 
based solely on vision.  
In this dissertation, broadly speaking, I study how motivational 
orientation lowers sensory thresholds. In reality, my line of work began 
by studying the effect of avoidant emotions on sensory thresholds, but 
as it progressed, it became clear that motivational orientation was a 
crucial factor inherent in the emotions that were studied. Theorists 
have claimed that humans have two broad motivational orientations, 
approach and avoidance, and these can manifest as specific emotional 
states (Elliot, 2008). Research has shown that general avoidance 
motivational orientation and specific avoidant emotions are functional 
because they enhance vigilance. My research focuses on one type of 
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vigilance, detection thresholds of faint stimuli ― stimuli that are at the 
boundaries of conscious experience. I argue that under an avoidance 
motivational orientation or when experiencing an avoidant emotion, it 
is functional to have a lowered threshold because this would allow 
perceivers to detect extremely faint stimuli. In other words, general 
avoidant orientation, as well as specific avoidant emotions, allow a very 
weak stimulus (comparable to #8 or #9 in Figure i) which normally 
appears undetectable to be detected.  
In Chapter 1, I present a framework on the influence of 
emotional states on perceptual limits, boundaries placed on perception 
abilities. Perceptual threshold—the main focus of my research—is one 
of these limits. I explain the functions of emotions; define what 
constitute perceptual limits or not; review what has been found in the 
literature; and suggest possible mechanisms at various levels – from 
neural to physiological to evolutionary processes.  
In this preface I started with examples from vision to illustrate 
examples of detection thresholds. My work, however, focuses on 
olfaction and audition. In Chapter 2, I present empirical studies testing 
the influence of avoidant emotions on olfactory detection thresholds. 
Thus, in this line of research, I tested that avoidant emotions, disgust 
and fear, lower sensory thresholds.  
In Chapter 3, I investigate whether disgust lowers olfactory 
thresholds because disgust influences general olfactory sensitivity (the 
“general sensitivity hypothesis”), or because of the fit between the 
negative valence of the scent and disgust (the valence-fit hypothesis). I 
tested this valence-fit hypothesis stringently using scents of opposite 
valences.  
iv 
 
In Chapter 4, I investigated the influence of motivational 
orientation on perceptual limits in a different modality. I tested how 
and why general approach and avoidance motivational orientations 
influence auditory thresholds.  
 Each chapter of this dissertation is based on a scientific article. 
Therefore, each chapter can be read independently, and in any order. 
Some overlap in terms of theoretical background and methodology may 
be encountered. I report all studies conducted within these lines of 
research. Data and syntax are available upon request.
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CHAPTER 1 
 
Do Avoidant Emotions Extend  
Perceptual Limits?* 
 
Abstract 
The functions of the avoidant emotions fear and disgust in 
guiding behaviors, cognition (e.g., attention, memory, etc.), and 
perceptual processes (e.g., intensity estimates) have been well-
established. Here we focus on a specific aspect of perception that has 
gained interest in recent years, namely, perceptual limits ― the 
extraordinary achievement of a perceptual outcome. We review relevant 
research on vision, olfaction, somatosensation, and audition, showing 
that avoidant emotions are often capable of extending our sensory 
capabilities. Precise mechanisms of these effects deserve greater 
integrative research efforts in the future. We also highlight that simple 
theorizing based merely on the functional aspects of emotion and 
perception may not be fruitful. Instead, investigators should consider 
how evolutionary, physiological, and neural mechanisms converge in 
shaping sensory capabilities.  
  
                                                             
* This chapter is based on: Chan, K. Q., Clore, G. L., Holland, R. W., & van 
Knippenberg, A. (in-prep). Do avoidant emotions extend perceptual limits? 
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Don’t we sometimes wish that we could see better, for example, 
when searching for our house keys in complete darkness or driving 
through fog? Humans have poorer vision compared to many animals, in 
part because the human eye lacks a large eyeball, a large lens, a large 
optical aperture, and a tapetum lucidum (retinal refractor). These are 
unchangeable morphological and anatomical constraints. However, 
even when bounded by these constraints, recent research has revealed 
that we can nevertheless have better visual capabilities under certain 
motivational and emotional states (e.g., Langer, Djikic, Pirson, Madenci, 
& Donohue, 2010). The purpose of this article is to review research on 
how motivational and emotional states influence perceptual limits, 
boundaries placed on perception abilities, such as the faintest light, 
smell, or touch that one can detect.  
This chapter focuses on the perceptual limits that have been 
found in various sensory modalities, and how emotional or motivational 
conditions affect them. We adopt a functional view of sensory 
mechanisms based on what a given sensory system can or cannot do, 
and examine how those functions are affected as part of emotional or 
motivational states. Our ultimate aim is to review relevant research and 
to chart new territories for future research. This chapter is divided into 
six sections. In the first section, we outline the functionalities of 
avoidant emotion. In the second section, we define perceptual limits, 
explain what constitutes perceptual limits or not, and list some 
examples. In the third section, we review relevant research how 
avoidant emotions change perceptual limits; this review contains 
findings mostly from vision because research within this area has 
almost exclusively focused on visual processing. In the fourth section, 
we introduce and discuss our own work in olfaction and audition. Then, 
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we speculate on the possible mechanisms that lead avoidant emotions 
to change perceptual limits, and finally contemplate some future 
directions. 
 
The functions of avoidant emotions 
Emotions are short-lived psychophysiological phenomena that 
provide information and motivation for adapting to changing 
environmental demands (Frijda, 1994; Levenson, 1999). 
Psychologically, emotional reactions can alter attention, regulate 
cognitive processing, and affect behavioral inclinations. Physiologically, 
emotional reactions may be apparent in facial expressions, muscle tone, 
voice prosody, as well as effect changes in the autonomic nervous 
system and endocrine activity. Emotions represent the position of 
individuals relative to their environment, which may include 
inclinations to approach or avoid certain people, objects, actions, and 
ideas (Levenson, 1999). It is assumed that such bodily and behavioral 
modes of representing emotionally significant events are functional, 
allowing perception, thought, and action to be tuned to the situation one 
is in. 
Emotion researchers have studied many emotions, such as 
happiness, sadness, fear, anger, disgust, surprise, contempt, guilt, 
embarrassment, shame, amusement, sympathy, love, jealousy, pride, 
schadenfreude, and so on. The variety of emotions have also led some 
researchers to devise taxonomies, classifying emotions into categories 
such as basic–secondary (Ekman, 1992), positive–negative (Watson & 
Tellegen, 1985), self-conscious–non-self-conscious (Tracy, Robins, 
Tangney, 2007), approach–avoidance (Elliot, Eder, & Harmon-Jones, 
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2013). Here we focus on one particular class of emotions: avoidant 
emotions.  
Avoidant emotions operate in part to prepare the body for 
dealing with particular kinds of threats and challenges. Avoidant 
emotions, such as fear and disgust, seem to serve this function. When 
fear is aroused, cardiovascular activity is often raised to levels beyond 
those thought to be healthy for long-term survival, but these increases 
may be useful – and perhaps necessary – for the short-term coping with 
the immediate threat, such as escaping (Levenson, 1999). Similarly, 
disgust may involve constriction of air passages, increases in the 
sensitivity of the gag reflex, and other reactions that would not be 
optimal for the goal of taking in food and oxygen, but which might serve 
the short-term goal of rejecting noxious and harmful substances 
(Schaller & Duncan, 2007). 
Avoidant emotions are negative in valence. However, not all 
negative emotions are avoidant. Sadness and anger are both negative 
emotions, but sadness is not avoidant and anger is typically considered 
to be an approach emotion (e.g., Carver & Harmon-Jones, 2009). What 
distinguishes avoidant emotions from other negative emotions is that 
avoidant emotions involve the underlying core motivation to protect 
the self from harm (Neuberg, Kenrick, & Schaller, 2011). Neuberg and 
colleagues (2011) proposed that humans have a threat management 
system, a precautionary system consisting of a suite of components that 
maximizes evolutionary fitness. The avoidant emotions, fear and disgust, 
play a crucial role in this threat management system because they 
motivate and coordinate adaptive behaviors.  
At times, however, threats are not easily discernable. Much like 
trying to find a tiny cluster of yellowish-grey mold on soon-to-be-
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expired brown bread, the ability to detect, discriminate, and 
subsequently identify these threats places great demands on an 
individual’s cognitive and perceptual systems. Levenson (1999) 
theorized that emotions lead to several “response packages” (p. 485), 
and enhancing an individual’s perceptual capabilities is one of them. 
Next we focus on a particular type of enhanced perceptual capability: 
the extension of perceptual limits. 
 
Perceptual limits 
Desirable objects and situations—such as nourishing food, 
protective shelter, and suitable mates—must be sought out and 
approached. Dangerous objects and situations—such as precipitous 
drops, falling objects, and hungry predators—must be avoided or fled 
from. Thus, to behave in an evolutionarily adaptive manner, individuals 
must somehow obtain information about what objects are present in 
the world around them, where they are located, and what opportunities 
they afford us. All of the senses—seeing, hearing, touching, tasting, and 
smelling—participate in this endeavor (see Palmer, 1999). 
 The existing literature includes claims that avoidance emotions 
enhance “perception” (for a review, see Brosch, Scherer, Grandjean, & 
Sander, 2013; Phelps, 2006; Stefanucci, Gagnon, & Lessard, 2011; Zadra 
& Clore, 2011). In some research, avoidance is implicated in the stimuli 
themselves. For example, visual search for threatening faces is faster 
(e.g., Hansen & Hansen, 1988); negative information “pops” into 
consciousness more frequently in binocular rivalry tasks (e.g., Yang, 
Zald, & Blake, 2007). In other research, avoidant emotions constitute 
psychological states experienced by the observer. For example, fear 
makes objects look bigger (e.g., Leibovich, Cohen, Henik, 2016; Vasey, 
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Vilensky, Heath, Harbaugh, Buffington, & Fazio, 2012; but see Firestone 
& Scholl, 2014, in-press), hills steeper (e.g., Proffitt, 2009; Stefanucci, 
Proffitt, Clore, & Parekh, 2008), sounds louder (Siegal & Stefanucci, 
2007), and selected neural regions are activated more strongly 
(Vuileumier, 2009).   
However, such enhancement in perception does not per se 
imply any change in perceptual limits because not all perceptual tasks 
involve perceptual limits. Consider the finding that approach motivation 
involves a right-side bias (Roskes, Slighte, Shalvi, & De Dreu, 2011, 
2014), which can be measured using a line-bisection task where 
individuals have to indicate the mid-point of a horizontal line. This is a 
visual perception task, but it does not share the qualitative nature of a 
task involving perceptual limits, such as an auditory threshold task 
where individuals report the softest sound that they can hear. In 
addition, inherent in the connotation of limits is that the underlying unit 
of measurement must be on some continuous measure. Thus, the ability 
to discriminate the scent of roses from that of lilies is not a perceptual 
limit, but the minimum concentration required for an individual to 
detect a rose scent is.  
People tend to think of limits as fixed. The idea that perceptual 
limits may be extended might sound paradoxical, because a limit that 
can be extended was never a limit in the first place. In reality, limits are 
always bounded by two things. First, perceptual limits are in part 
determined by the anatomy of our sense organs. For example, the 
position of our eye sockets determines binocular vision, trading better 
visual acuity for a narrower field of vision; or the position of our pinnae 
(the “outer ear”), predisposing us to localize sounds better when they 
are in front of us than when they are behind us (Middlebrooks & Green, 
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1991). No matter how hard we try, our field of vision cannot exceed 120 
degrees, and localization of sounds frontward is always better. These 
are typical types of perceptual limits imposed by our physiology. If we 
develop larger pinnae, localizing sound may improve (Hofman, Riswick, 
& Opstal, 1998); if we develop retinal refractors, we may acquire night 
vision like cats. 
Second, perceptual limits are bounded by the circumstances of 
measurement. People used to think that the smallest distance between 
two points that our eyes can tell apart is 0.1 mm, until magnifying 
glasses (and subsequently, the optical microscope) was invented 
(Hooke, 1665). Similarly, auditory thresholds would certainly be lower 
when an observer is in a quiet room rather than a noisy one, or one can 
surely see farther with binoculars than without. Therefore, perceptual 
limits can be defined as the extraordinary achievement of a perceptual 
outcome1 within a given situation (e.g., under optimal laboratory 
conditions, unaided by artificial equipment, etc.). In other words, the 
pertinent question is: how much better can individuals in [state X] do 
[perceptual activity Y]? Using this definition, judgments of an object’s 
size (e.g., Leibovich et al, in-press; Vasey et al, 2012), angle (e.g., Proffitt, 
2009; Stefanucci et al., 2008), or intensity (Siegal & Stefanucci, 2007) do 
not constitute limits because they do not probe for “extraordinary” 
outcomes; measures of neural responses (e.g., Kass, Rosenthal, 
Pottackal, & McGann, 2013) or psychophysiological events (e.g., event-
related potentials, pupil dilation, etc.) would not qualify, because they 
                                                             
1This is not the same as “the achievement of an extraordinary perceptual 
outcome” (e.g., visual illusions or hallucinations). The position of the adjectival 
modifier “extraordinary” is important. 
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lack the qualia to be considered a “perceptual outcome”.2 It is important 
to make the distinction between whether the perception occurs as an 
independent variable or as a dependent variable. Our focus (avoidant 
emotions affecting perceptual limits) entails that the dependent 
variable must be a perceptual outcome, and avoidant emotions must be 
experienced by the observer. Although functional MRI scans or 
psychophysiological measures can be obtained while participants are 
exposed to fear- or disgust-inducing pictures and these dependent 
measures may be affected by seeing these pictures, these dependent 
variables are not “perceptual” in any meaningful way.  
 Within these physiological constraints and circumstances of 
measurement, here we propose that without the need to alter our 
anatomy or strapping on artificial equipment, avoidant emotions 
experienced by the observer can extend perceptual limits. Table 1 lists 
some examples of perceptual limits, and these are explained briefly in 
the Appendix. However, only some have received support of avoidant 
emotions altering these limits.  
 
  
                                                             
2 This is also known as the “hard” problem of consciousness (Chalmers, 1995) – 
even if we could map all neural correlates of consciousness, we still cannot 
understand the subjective experience of the person. 
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Table 1.  
Examples of perceptual limits within each sensory modality. 
Modality Possible 
perceptual limits 
Examples 
Vision   
 Contrast sensitivity 
Detection threshold 
Spatial resolution 
Temporal 
resolution 
Spectral sensitivity 
Faintest difference in shades 
Faintest light; stereoscopic 
depth 
Smallest gap  
Fastest flicker 
Infrared or ultraviolet 
Audition   
 Detection threshold 
Temporal 
resolution 
Frequency 
Localization  
Softest sound 
Hearing tones as separate 
Lowest (< 20 Hz) or highest 
(> 20 kHz) tones 
Minimum auditory angle 
Olfaction   
 Detection threshold 
Localization 
Faintest smell 
Smallest olfactory angle 
Somatosensation   
 Detection threshold 
Spatial resolution 
Temporal 
resolution 
Softest touch 
Grating orientation 
discrimination 
Vibrating pulses 
Gustation   
 Detection threshold Least concentrated tastant 
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The influence of avoidant emotion on perceptual limits in vision 
 Avoidant emotions activate a set of response packages that have 
been selected by evolutionary processes to maximize an organisms’ 
fitness, and enhancing perceptual capabilities is one of them (Levenson, 
1999). The fact that emotions influence “perception” is not new; the 
idea dates back to the New Look approach to perception (Bruner, 1957), 
which regards perception as a constructive process based on top-down 
factors, such as individuals’ expectations, needs, and desires. Two 
classic examples are how poorer individuals overestimate the sizes of 
coins (Bruner & Goodman, 1947), and how individuals tend to interpret 
an ambiguous stimulus in a way that favors their desired outcomes 
(Balcetis & Dunning, 2006). However, overestimating coin sizes and 
wishful seeing are not perceptual limits per se.  
The novel idea we advance here is that avoidant emotions 
influences perceptual limits, not merely “perception”, which is 
sometimes used as a nondescript term. The benefit of having extended 
perceptual limits is clear: When perceptual limits are extended, we can 
accurately perceive things that we would normally not be able to 
perceive. In some ways, this is similar to how we can see minute details 
of things when our spatial resolution is artificially extended with 
magnifying glasses. Although we listed many types of perceptual limits 
in Table 1, only a few have been studied in relation to avoidant 
emotions. We first review these in the domain of vision where most 
research has been done. This review is meant to be exhaustive to the 
best of our knowledge. However, we anticipate that readers may 
occasionally, feel that we have omitted some evidence that appears to 
support our idea of perceptual limits but does not meet our criteria as 
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perceptual limits. We document such instances in Footnote 3.3 In the 
following section, we then discuss work that we have done on testing 
perceptual limits in other modalities.  
 
 Temporal limits 
 Visual scenes rarely remain static. Until photography was 
invented, it was debatable whether a galloping horse lifts all its four 
hooves off the ground at any one time (cf. Holcombe, 2009) because 
there is a temporal limit on vision. A greater temporal limit could 
accelerate visual processing of cues related to type, motion, and 
direction. In a prototypical setup, an observer is asked to report two 
letter targets embedded in a stream of rapidly presented digits. When 
two visual images (targets) are flashed very quickly in close succession 
to each other, individuals are typically able to detect the first one 
without any awareness of the second image (Shapiro, Raymond, Arnell, 
1997). This attentional blindness, also termed attentional blink, is a 
result of a visual buffer that is unable to cope with the demands of the 
                                                             
3 Several studies appear to provide evidence that avoidant emotions enhance 
perceptual limits but we argue that they veer away from the cause-and-effect 
that we imply in this article. Consider two studies here: (1) participants were 
faster to search for fear-relevant targets (snakes or spiders) in grid-pattern 
arrays of fear-irrelevant distractors (e.g., flowers or mushrooms; Öhman, Flykt, 
& Esteves, 2001); (2) negative emotional stimuli pops into consciousness faster 
in binocular rivalry tasks than neutral stimuli (e.g., Alpers, Ruhleder, Walz, 
Mühlberger, & Pauli, 2005). Although time is a ratio-scale, continuous measure 
with a lower limit (i.e., 0 sec), one must note the emotion is integral in the 
stimuli and was not experienced exogenously (i.e., independently) from the 
stimuli. One may argue that endogenous experience of emotions triggered by 
the stimuli also demonstrates that avoidant emotions enhance perceptual 
limits. This argument, however persuasive, is logically problematic: 
Experiences triggered by the stimuli therefore leads the stimuli to be more 
easily detected begs the question “How does one know an object exists in the 
first place?” 
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situation. However, fearful stimuli seem to be the exception. When the 
second visual image has a fearful quality, the attention system gives it 
priority in processing (Anderson, 2005) such that individuals are now 
able to notice it.  
 The attentional blink requires a first task as a trigger. However, 
there are other temporal tasks that do not require this. A temporal 
resolution is the interval over which the system blurs information 
together. When two images are located in the same space but are 
displaced temporally, the result is a (con)fused image. For example, 
when the word “jump” and “pink” are alternated in the same location at 
5 Hz (100 ms/word), observers sometimes report seeing “junk” or 
“pimp” (Holcombe & Judson, 2007).  Both types of limits (i.e., 
attentional blink and temporal resolution) are probably caused by 
limits at high-level processing stages. As such, emotion effects 
applicable to the attentional blink may also be observed in temporal 
resolution tasks. In one experiment (Bocanegra & Zeelenberg, 2011a), a 
fearful or neutral cue was presented prior to a visual target. The visual 
target (e.g., a circle) was either presented twice, each separated by a 
brief 10 – 30 ms temporal gap, or continuously for the same amount of 
time. Participants were asked to detect whether they saw a “flicker” or 
not. If fear improved temporal resolution, participants would tend to 
notice the brief temporal gap as a flicker, and indeed they were more 
accurate in identifying these flickering trials. Taken together, the 
attenuation of attentional blindness for fearful stimuli (Anderson, 2005) 
and the improved flicker detection due to fearful cues (Bocanegra & 
Zeelenberg, 2011a) both show that temporal limits are improved under 
fearful conditions.  
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Spatial limits 
 Often it is not only useful to know whether an object is present 
or not, but also to identify what that object is. While high contrast 
sensitivity improves the ability to distinguish foreground objects from 
their backgrounds, identifying the object requires more than just that; 
object identification would benefit much from having high spatial 
resolution as well. From a distance, a grey object on the ground can be a 
rock or a rabbit; falconiformes (eagles, falcons and hawks) can 
recognize small prey from large distances because survival in their 
natural habitat has required adaptation of its visual system to achieve 
high spatial resolution (visual acuity).  
In humans, investigators have explored whether emotions 
benefit spatial resolution. Specifically, in one experiment (Bocanegra & 
Zeelenberg, 2011b), observers had to indicate whether a Landolt figure 
contained a small spatial gap or not (see Figure 1). The presentation of 
the square was preceded by a fearful or neutral face. The authors 
controlled for the effects of attention by presenting the face either at the 
same location as the Landolt figure, or at a different location. The 
results indicated that fearful faces presented at the same location 
improved spatial resolution over neutral faces. Making fine visual 
discriminations should be particularly adaptive for identifying things 
from a distance, and the presence of threat appears to enhance spatial 
resolution. 
 
Figure 1. A Landolt circle with a gap at the top. Circles and gaps of varying sizes 
are commonly used in optometry and research to test visual acuity. 
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Contrast sensitivity 
Contrast sensitivity, the ability to detect small increments in 
shades of gray on a uniform background, is one of the main limiting 
factors in a wide variety of visual tasks. In other words, contrast 
sensitivity defines the threshold between the visible and invisible (Pelli 
& Bex, 2013). It is important in some occupations, such as for a 
radiologist to detect a tumor on an x-ray, but it is also important in daily 
functioning, especially in situations of low light, fog, or glare, when the 
contrast between objects and their background is reduced. Driving at 
night or through fog is an example of an activity that requires good 
contrast sensitivity for safety. More generally, sensitivity to contrast 
provides us with information about the boundaries of objects and 
facilitates object identification. 
Objects are more easily seen if the contrast between the focal 
target and the background is high. The visual system has evolved ways 
to deal with low contrast objects. One of the ways is to enhance the 
contrast sensitivity so that foreground-background shade differences 
are amplified. Contrast sensitivity was thought to be changeable only by 
organic factors, such as macular pathologies (see Pelli & Bax, 2013), or 
neurochemical factors (Bubl, Kern, Ebert, Bach, & van Elst, 2010). 
However, recent research has shown that emotions can modulate 
contrast sensitivity too. One of the ways emotions are functional is that 
they help us to detect relevant cues in the environment.  
It is functional to improve contrast sensitivity in states of fear so 
that subtle threat cues can more easily be seen. Indeed, in the first 
demonstration of its kind, researchers found that fear involves 
improvement in visual contrast sensitivity (Phelps, Ling, & Carrasco, 
2006). The experimenters presented fearful or neutral face cues prior 
 15 
 
to four peripheral Gabor patches (see Figure 2), which were at near-
threshold contrast. One target Gabor patch had a different tilt than the 
others and the observer’s task was to indicate which of the four patches 
was the target. The researchers found that masked presentation of a 
fear face improves contrast sensitivity, even after controlling for the 
possible confound of attention. Similarly, individuals who underwent an 
aversive cold pressor task also showed greater contrast sensitivity 
(Woods, Philbeck, & Wirtz, 2013). 
 
 
Figure 2. Gabor patches are sinusoidal gratings used in contrast sensitivity 
research. Various components of a Gabor patch can be specified, such as the 
grating frequency, size, contrast, orientation, and many more.    
 
In another line of research, Sherman, Haidt, and Clore (2012) 
found that disgust enhanced the visual system’s ability to detect 
differences in coloration. In one experiment, participants viewed either 
neutral, disgust-, or fear-inducing pictures and then engaged in a 
perceptual discrimination task. Faint-grey digits were presented against 
a light or dark background, and participants had to read the number. 
This method essentially assesses contrast sensitivity, although not with 
Gabor patches as in Phelps et al. (2006). The researchers found that in 
the disgust condition, perceptual discrimination was superior among 
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individuals high in disgust sensitivity. However, this was true only 
when targets were presented against a light background. The idea is 
that in most ecological settings, dirt or impurities appear on light-color 
backgrounds (e.g., stains on the toilet bowl), rather than against dark-
color backdrops. Disgust is a powerful emotion that presumably serves 
this goal of avoiding infection, and as a result, leads to better detection 
of possible impurities. Consistent with the results of Phelps et al (2006), 
fear also increased contrast sensitivity against both light and dark 
backgrounds.  
 
Stereoacuity 
 Depth perception is greatly improved by binocular vision 
because each of our two eyes, being slightly apart, receives slightly 
different visual information, which the brain then integrates to give 
information about depth. In a three-dimension world, having accurate 
depth perception – being able to judge spatial distances between the 
self and an object – could prove essential for avoiding objects or 
navigation. Depth perception can be measured by presenting 
participants with two rods of varying distance from the self, and having 
participants judge which of the two rods was closer in depth to their 
location. The minimum distance needed to perceive a distance in depth 
is the stereoscopic depth threshold. In one experiment (Woods et al., 
2013), it was found that when participants experienced an aversive cold 
pressor task, participants showed lower depth threshold. That is, 
participants were better able to perceive minute differences in distance 
between themselves a target object. 
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Beyond vision: Effects of avoidance emotions in olfactory and 
auditory threshold 
The research reviewed thus far on temporal resolution, spatial 
resolution, contrast sensitivity, and stereoacuity has exclusively focused 
on vision. If avoidant emotions are functional for perception, these 
functional benefits may extend to other modalities as well. Interestingly, 
with the exception of a brief report in somatosensation (Kelley & 
Schmeichel, 2014), the study of perceptual limits within other 
modalities such as olfaction and audition as a function of avoidance 
emotions has been largely neglected thus far.  
Recently, we have made some first steps to explore perceptual 
thresholds within these modalities. To clarify some terminology upfront, 
contrast sensitivity is a concept used mostly in vision. In other 
modalities, it is more common to use the term threshold. A threshold is 
the minimum amount of physical energy needed to trigger an 
experience of the stimuli. In daily parlance, one can refer to threshold as 
the reciprocal of sensitivity. We will use the term threshold to describe 
findings from modalities other than vision. 
 
Olfaction 
 One research investigated the effects of negative emotions 
(manipulated by presenting participants with a series of negatively 
valenced pictures) and found that negative emotions increased olfactory 
threshold (Pollatos et al., 2007). However, the negative stimuli used 
were a mixture of several negative emotions (sadness, fear, anger, and 
disgust) that are related to various motivational orientations. Hence it is 
unclear which emotions or motivational orientations were responsible 
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for the effect and, therefore, the study is less relevant for our review on 
avoidant emotions and perceptual limits.  
In Chan, Holland, van Loon, Arts, and van Knippenberg (in-press, 
Chapter 2), we specifically investigated the avoidant emotions, fear and 
disgust. We theorized that the improvement of visual contrast 
sensitivity during disgust (Sherman et al., 2012) may extend to smell 
sensitivity as well. We tested this hypothesis first by having participants 
view disgusting, appetizing, or neutral pictures while their olfactory 
thresholds were assessed with a battery of varying concentrations of 
the odorant n-butanol (Sniffin’ Sticks; Hummel, Sekinger, Wolf, Pauli, & 
Kobal, 1997), which smells like whiteboard marker ink and is 
commonly used to assess olfactory function. On each trial of the Sniffin’ 
Sticks procedure, participants were presented with a triplet of sticks, of 
which one contained the odorant and the other two were blanks. The 
participant’s task was to identify the stick that smelled different. The 
procedure started with participants sniffing target sticks (within 
triplets) containing a concentration of n-butanol way below normal 
human threshold. If the participant’s answer was wrong, the next trial 
(triplet) would contain a target stick of a higher n-butanol 
concentration. This procedure repeats until a point at which the 
concentration is high enough such that the participant’s answer was 
correct. When this happened, the next trial would contain a target stick 
of a lower n-butanol concentration, triggering what is called a “reversal 
point” in the procedure. The procedure continues until a wrong 
response was given, thereby triggering another reversal. The whole 
procedure repeats until seven reversal points were obtained. The 
average value of the last four reversals constituted the olfactory 
threshold.  
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The results of our initial two studies (Studies 2.1 and 2.2) 
showed that participants who were viewing disgust pictures were able 
to detect scents with lower odorant concentrations compared to 
participants who were viewing neutral or appetizing pictures. In a 
subsequent study (Study 2.3), we also included a fear manipulation. We 
found that both avoidant emotions, disgust and fear, lowered olfactory 
threshold, and this effect was particularly strong for individuals high in 
trait disgust sensitivity, the tendency to experience disgust. 
Interestingly, the latter effect was also found when participants were 
viewing fearful pictures. Hence, it is possible that avoidant emotions in 
general lead one to have a lower olfactory threshold. 
In subsequent work, we further tested the mechanism 
underlying this effect. Because both fear and disgust lowered olfactory 
threshold, it was possible that these emotions induced a general 
vigilance for odors. We called this the general vigilance hypothesis. 
However it was also possible that threshold was lowered not because of 
the avoidant component of fear and disgust, but because participants in 
a negative emotional state were better able to detect an unpleasant 
scent, which n-butanol incidentally was. We called this the valence-fit 
hypothesis. To tease apart these hypotheses, we (Chan, van Dooren, 
Holland, & van Knippenberg, 2016; Chapter 3) tested thresholds for 
both n-butanol and phenylethanol, which was a positive scent, after a 
manipulation of disgust, happy, and neutral emotions. We hypothesized 
that if disgust improves general olfactory sensitivity, then disgust would 
lower thresholds towards both scents; if disgust improves olfactory 
sensitivity only to negatively valenced smells, then disgust would not 
lower thresholds towards phenylethanol. The results revealed that 
disgust (compared to neutral or happiness conditions) lowered 
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olfactory thresholds to both n-butanol and phenylethanol. From these 
two sets of studies, we concluded that avoidant emotions lower general 
olfactory thresholds.  
 
Audition 
 The approach–avoidance distinction is integral to an 
understanding of emotion (Elliot et al., 2013). Disgust and fear are both 
avoidant emotions and both lowered olfactory (Chan et al., in-press; 
Chapter 3) and visual thresholds (e.g., Phelps et al., 2006; Sherman et al., 
2012). In another line of research, we examined whether directly 
inducing an avoidance orientation would reduce thresholds. We tested 
this in the auditory domain (Chan, Holland, Hengstler, & van 
Knippenberg, 2016; Chapter 4). In a series of studies, participants 
adopted either an arm flexion or extension as a manipulation of 
approach or avoidance motivational orientation (Cacioppo, Priester, & 
Berntson, 1993), respectively, while their auditory thresholds were 
measured in a double staircase paradigm (see Figure 3). This paradigm 
started with presenting discrete tones that were either clearly audible, 
or inaudible. In the descending staircase, participants heard an audible 
tone and responded to it with a mouse click. The next presentation of 
this tone was then softer. The procedure repeated until participants 
could no longer hear the tone. This triggered a reversal, where the next 
presentation of this tone was louder. When this tone became detectable, 
a reversal occurred again and the next presentation of the tone was 
softer. A similar procedure occurred in the ascending staircase, which 
was interwoven with the descending staircase. In the ascending 
staircase, participants were presented with an inaudible tone that 
became progressively louder until participants detected it, and 
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progressively softer when participants failed to detect it. The alternate 
loud-soft adjustments in both staircases were repeated until a stable 
threshold was obtained (Cornsweet, 1962; Leek, 2001; Silva, Souza, 
Bevilacqua, & Lopes, 2011).  
 
 
Figure 3. Double staircase procedure.  
 
Our initial two studies in this line of research (Studies 4.1 and 
4.2) indicated that individuals under an avoidant motivational 
orientation displayed a lower auditory threshold to high frequency 
tones (4000 Hz) but not to low frequency tones (200 Hz, 500 Hz, 1000 
Hz). This could be because high frequency tones are both negative and 
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rare in the environment. Some studies have shown that an avoidant 
motivational orientation facilitates responses to negative stimuli 
(Whalen, 1998), whereas others reported such effects for rare stimuli 
(Foote et al., 1983; Svensson, 1987). Therefore, negativity and mere 
novelty were both strong candidates to explain our selective findings 
for motivational orientation to influence auditory threshold. These 
ideas was further bolstered by our studies (Studies 4.3A and 4.3B) in 
which indeed our high frequency sounds were more negatively 
evaluated compared to the lower frequency tones. Furthermore, an 
analysis of natural sounds (Bradley & Lang, 2007) clearly revealed that 
sounds with a frequency that is higher than 2000 Hz are rare.   
Hence, in follow-up experiments, we investigated the novelty 
and valence explanations separately. In one study (Study 4.4), we 
manipulated the novelty of tones by habituating participants to the 
4000 Hz tone in the first part of the experiment, and measured the 
thresholds while participants were in an approach/avoidance 
motivational orientation in the second part of the experiment. We 
hypothesized that if avoidant individuals had a lower auditory 
threshold to high frequency tones because these frequencies were rare, 
then repeated exposure to these tones would make these tones no 
longer rare, and hence negating any threshold differences. This, 
however, did not happen; we did not find an interaction between the 
motivational orientation and novelty manipulation. At the same time, 
we should be cautious to fully dismiss the novelty explanation, because 
in this specific study we did not find a difference between approach and 
avoidance orientation for the novel 4000 Hz stimuli either. 
In the next set of experiments (Studies 4.5A and 4.5B), we tested 
the valence explanation. We reasoned that if avoidant individuals had a 
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lower auditory threshold to high frequency tones because these 
frequencies were negative, then manipulating the valence of neutral 
tones would be a way to test if valence was the critical factor. We 
manipulated the valence of the tone, employing a conditioning 
paradigm in which we paired neutral tones (1000Hz) with positive or 
negative images in the first part of the experiment, and measured the 
thresholds while participants were in an approach or avoidance 
motivational orientation in the second part of the experiment. We found 
that when neutral tones acquired negative valence, avoidant individuals 
had a lower threshold for these tones. Hence, we concluded that 
avoidant motivation orientation lowers thresholds to high frequency 
sounds because these sounds are negative in valence, but we cannot 
make strong conclusions about this effect because a meta-analysis 
across these studies revealed that the effect is weak. 
 
Integrating our findings in olfaction and audition 
Do the effects involve merely the negativity of emotions? 
Approach–avoidance (motivational orientation) and emotional valence 
(positive vs. negative phenomenological experience) are inextricably 
intertwined; approach motivation is often linked to positive feelings, 
and avoidance motivation is often linked to negative feelings (Lang, 
1995; Russell & Carroll, 1999; Watson, Wiese, Vaidya, & Tellegen, 1999). 
Therefore, it may be tempting to conclude that negative emotions in 
general, whether experienced as a phenomenological state or a reaction 
to a stimulus, improve sensitivity. However, it may be more fruitful to 
limit this claim to avoidant emotions, particularly those with high 
arousal components like fear and disgust. In fact, a recent study (Woods, 
Philbeck, & Wirtz, 2013) that directly manipulated arousal also found 
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that arousal lowered visual threshold. Other negative but non-avoidant 
emotions such as sadness produce different — sometimes mixed — sets 
of findings. For example, individuals in depressed mood states have a 
higher threshold in vision (e.g., Dixon & Lear, 1962), audition (Aubert-
Khalfa et al., 2010), and olfaction (e.g., Pause, Miranda, Goder, Aldenhoff, 
& Ferstl, 2001). In clinical cases, researchers have found individuals 
with depression tend to have higher olfactory thresholds compared to 
normal control individuals (Schablitzky & Pause, 2014). However, 
conflicting and null findings have been reported (see Schablitzky & 
Pause, 2014, for a review) and the underlying neurobiological 
explanations for clinical cases remain unclear. 
 When does negativity of the stimuli moderate the effect of 
avoidant states? In our study on olfaction, disgust lowered threshold for 
both positive and negative scents, whereas in our studies on audition, 
avoidant motivational orientation lowered auditory thresholds to high 
but not low frequency sounds, with the former sounds being more 
negative. It is tempting to attribute the difference to the experimental 
situation during smelling vs. hearing. In our olfactory experiments, 
participants expressed some apprehension when they were asked to 
smell the sticks. It is possible the prospect of incorporating chemical 
compounds into the body (Rozin, Haidt, & McCauley, 2008) naturally 
induced apprehension, regardless of what the valence of the odor was. 
Sounds, on the other hand, are not chemical molecules but waves, and 
are not incorporated into the body the same way chemical compounds 
are. Hence a hearing task is rather innocuous, thereby allowing stimuli 
valence to exert its effect. This proposition, however, does not hold 
water alongside studies regarding fear on visual perceptual limits 
mentioned above (e.g., Bocanegra & Zeelenberg, 2011a; 2011b; 
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Sherman et al., 2012; Phelps et al., 2006) where the stimuli used were 
neutral (Landolt circles, gabor patches, black-white shapes, etc.). 
Therefore, the interaction between stimulus valence and avoidance 
emotions on perceptual limits remains an open question and warrants 
more research. 
It seems that the effects within olfaction are more robust than 
that within audition. It is possible that this is because in the 
evolutionary timescale, olfaction is a more primitive faculty than 
audition and hence has more direct links to emotion subcortical areas of 
the brain (Soudry, Lemogne, Malinvaud, Consoli, & Bonfils, 2011; see 
also Figure 4). However it is admittedly difficult to compare between 
the two modalities because different manipulations (pictures vs. bodily 
feedback) were used our research. Future work can shed more light by 
directly manipulating avoidant emotions when assessing auditory 
thresholds. 
 
What are the possible mechanisms? 
The accrued evidence indicates that avoidant emotions, such as 
fear and disgust, extend our perceptual capabilities. However, the 
mechanisms remain poorly understood and in this section, we outline 
some possible mechanisms. We do not imply that any one of them is 
necessary or sufficient, in part because they concern different levels of 
analysis, from distal evolutionary advantages to proximal neural, 
physiological, and attentional processes.  
 
Evolutionary mechanisms 
An increase in perceptual capabilities would seem to have had 
the evolutionary benefit of allowing an organism to more readily 
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perceive threat-relevant objects, within its environmental niche. 
Emotions convey information about the state of the environment (Clore 
& Schwarz, 2003), relative to one’s physiological (Schnall, Zadra, & 
Proffitt, 2010) or social resources (Schnall, Harber, Stefanucci, & Proffitt, 
2008). This information may signal to the organism that something is 
amiss in the environment, so that being able to take in a wider range of 
perceptual information to better detect whether something is a threat 
or not. 
Higher level evolutionary theorizing should be compatible with 
lower levels of analyses, such as those at a developmental or 
physiological level. If not, either level of theorizing should be revised. 
For example, although a simple evolutionary perspective would predict 
that fear increases sensitivity in touch as it does for sight (Phelps et al., 
2006). However, psychophysiological perspectives would predict a 
decrease in tactile sensitivity because fear-related responses tend to 
cause vascular resistance and decreased skin temperature.  Indeed, 
when investigators (Kelley & Schmeichel, 2014) examined the effects of 
fear on somatosensory spatial resolution, they found that fear 
decreased tactile sensitivity, as measured with the two-point 
discrimination task.4 A more refined evolutionary perspective could be 
that fear enhances some forms of sensory perception that are more 
important in a particular situation (e.g., vision; Phelps et al., 2006) at 
the expense of other perceptual systems in that particular situation (e.g. 
                                                             
4 The task involved participants receiving pokes of one point or two points 
varying between 2-8 mm apart and participants had to report whether two 
points or one point were presented. The validity of the two-point 
discrimination task as a measure of spatial resolution has been criticized (Craig 
& Johnson, 2000; Johnson & Phillips, 1981; Lundborg & Rosen, 2004; Tong, 
Mao, & Goldreich, 2013). 
 27 
 
somatosensory information). In any case, our emphasis is that the 
evolutionary perspectives should not be used as a broad brush for 
theorizing, without considering the proximal mechanisms, which we 
examine next. 
 
Physiological mechanisms 
Avoidance emotions may influence perceptual limits by means 
of physiological changes as well. It is well-known that facial expressions 
often accompany emotions. In particular the expression of fear is linked 
to the increase acquisition of sensory input (Susskind, Lee, Cusi, Feiman, 
Grabski, & Anderson, 2008). Having more sensory input probably 
increases the chance that some of the inputs will be transduced, and 
latter interpreted by the relevant cortices. Consider the finding that fear 
increases contrast sensitivity (Phelps et al., 2006). The contrast 
sensitivity function (CSF) is a product of optical and neural factors. 
Optically, the quality of the retinal image (determined by the 
modulation transfer function) strongly depends on pupil size (Artal & 
Navarro, 1994). Past research has already indicated that fear increases 
pupil dilation (Bradley, Miccoli, Escrig, & Lang, 2008).  Hence, it is 
possible that fear increases contrast sensitivity via pupil dilation. 
Because pupil dilation is an indicator of emotional arousal and 
autonomic activation (Bradley et al., 2008), this might also explain why 
in disgust – a highly arousing emotion, just like fear – individuals were 
better able to extract darkened foreground stimuli from lighter 
backgrounds (Sherman et al. 2012; see also Lee, Baek, Lu, & Mather, 
2014). In fact, pupil dilation is also related to the visual system’s 
temporal resolution (Wierda, van Rijn, Taatgen, & Martens, 2012). In 
addition, there are clear functional concomitants of enhanced pupil 
 28 
 
dilation, as pupil dilation has been found to correlate with effort 
allocation (Rondeel, van Steenbergen, Holland, & van Knippenberg, 
2015) and response preparation (Moresi et al., 2008). Hence pupil 
dilation may be a crucial indicator of the mechanism by which visual 
limits are extended (Anderson, 2005; Bocanegra & Zeelenberg, 2011a; 
Phelps et al., 2006; Sherman et al., 2012). Exploring the extent to which 
physiology can explain other findings, particularly in other modalities, 
could be a fruitful agenda for future research. 
Could physiological arousal be a mediator? Recent animal 
research has demonstrated that arousal states modulate the 
responsiveness of neurons during early visual processing (Bezdudnaya 
et al., 2006; Neill & Stryker, 2010), and the studies that have 
manipulated fear and disgust certainly suggest so. However, highly 
arousing food stimuli (Chan et al., in-press; Chapter 3) did not increase 
olfactory sensitivity, suggesting that it is not arousal per se that is 
responsible for the extension of perceptual limits. Future studies may 
wish to include arousal as a covariate to investigate whether arousal 
plays any role.  
 
The role of attention 
Attention serves to modulate sensory processing across all 
sensory modalities and is integral to producing conscious percepts 
(Chun, Golomb, & Turk-Browne, 2011). Individuals have limited 
capacity to process all the stimuli impinging on their sensory system. 
Attentional mechanisms modulate and sustain focus on whatever 
information that is most relevant at a particular point in time. Crucially, 
in all modalities, attention directed towards a stimuli activates areas of 
the relevant cortices (see Chun et al., 2011, for a review). Recent 
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research has shown that attention modulates the connectivity between 
the thalamus (an important sensory relay center) and cortical areas 
(e.g., Plailly, Howard, Gitelman, & Gottfried, 2008), which may be 
important for the individuals to consciously analyze a stimulus.  
There are two major forms of attention.5 Exogenous attention 
refers to bottom-up, stimulus-driven attention where attention is 
automatically drawn towards a stimulus, such as a flashed stimuli or a 
presented sound. Endogenous attention, on the other hand, refers to 
top-down, goal-directed attentional control where attention can be 
directed voluntarily based on task demands. It is unlikely that 
exogenous attention is involved when avoidant emotions enhance 
perceptual limits. Researchers who found fear to increase visual 
contrast sensitivity have already ruled out the involvement of 
exogenous attention when they presented visual prompts in the same 
visual area of their target stimuli (Phelps et al., 2006). Similarly, in the 
olfactory research by Chan et al. (in-press; Chapter 3), blindfolded 
participants were given instructions to smell an odorant that was 
presented right under their nostrils, and such explicit instructions make 
it unlikely that participants’ attention would be directed elsewhere. On 
the other hand, it is possible that some form of endogenous attention is 
involved, such as greater interoceptive awareness (Craig, 2003). Fear 
and disgust are highly visceral emotions. As such, attention may be 
                                                             
5 We avoid using covert/overt attention because these two forms of attention 
are valid concepts in sensory systems (e.g., vision) that have a spatial structure. 
For example, in vision, covert attention can be directed around a visual space 
without any eye movements. Our work includes olfaction, and there is no 
evidence to suggest that attention can be shifted between nostrils covertly 
(Keller, 2011). However, overt spatial shifts of attention are possible in 
olfaction by head-turning. 
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drawn toward any visceral bodily reactions. This attention toward the 
self may also involve greater attention to incoming sensory signals. 
 
Neural mechanisms 
 Each sensory system has its unique way of transcribing and 
relaying signals to the relevant cortices. Processes that influence these 
unique pathways could potentially influence the eventual percept. 
Vision, hearing, gustation, and somatosensation all have bidirectional 
projections to the thalamus; olfaction is the only system that does not 
connect to the thalamus directly (see Figure 4). Conventionally the 
thalamus was thought to be a relay center for sensory signals, but 
recent evidence has suggested that it does not merely relay signals, but 
has modulatory capabilities as well (Lee & Sherman, 2010). Crucially, 
the amygdala projects to the thalamus and, independently, to the 
olfactory system. Because the amygdala is involved in emotion 
processing, it is not surprising that emotions influence perception. But 
what sort of emotions, what kind of perception, and in what direction? 
We explore these issues in greater detail next. 
Previous research has found that if a stimulus has been fear-
conditioned, neural responses to these stimuli become enhanced (e.g., 
Armony & Dolan, 2002; Li, Howard, Parrish, & Gottfried, 2008). As such, 
avoidant emotions can be said to amplify incoming sensory signals, 
much like an electronic amplifier increases the signal-to-noise ratio to 
produce clear audio recordings. Recall that all signals except olfaction 
pass through the thalamus, before reaching the sensory cortices either 
directly, or via the amygdala (see Figure 2). Hence there are two 
probable proximal mechanisms that could mediate this amplification: 
the amygdala and the thalamus. If there is only one common amplifier 
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for all sensory systems (including olfaction), then the amygdala6 is a 
more probable candidate than the thalamus because previous research 
has shown that avoidant emotions causes increases in olfactory 
sensitivity (Chan et al., in-press; Chapter 2). 
The amygdala is a brain region involved in emotion. Some 
scientists regard danger detection or vigilance as the fundamental role 
of the amygdala (Freese & Amaral, 2009; Whalen, 1998; see also 
Armony & LeDoux, 2000). For example, negative stimuli such as fearful 
faces trigger a stronger BOLD signal in the amygdala than neutral or 
happy faces (Pessoa, Guiterrez, & Ungerleider, 2002). However, the 
amygdala is not only involved in emotion processing, it also shares 
reciprocal connections with many other subcortical areas, including 
reciprocal connections to the thalamus – the dynamic sensory relay 
center for taste, vision, audition, and somatosensation – and the 
olfactory system. Thus, the amygdala not only receives sensory signals, 
but may also modify them. When neutral visual (Armony & Dolan, 
2002), olfactory (Li et al., 2008), or auditory stimuli (Buchel, Morris, 
Dolan, & Friston, 1998) acquire aversive emotional value via 
conditioning, these stimuli produce increased responses in the visual, 
olfactory, and auditory cortical areas, respectively. The enhanced 
cortical responses are therefore due not only to the sensory features of 
stimuli, but also to their emotional value. The amygdala is an important 
modulator of sensory activation, and possibly enhances perceptual 
acuity by amplifying sensory signals that passes through it (see also 
Krusemark & Li, 2012; Suslow et al., 2006). 
                                                             
6 In this review, we do not pinpoint specific amygdala subnuclei because 
functional MRI studies in humans do not have sufficient spatial resolution to 
conclusively differentiate which subnuclei could be involved (Whalen, 1998). 
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Figure 4. The bidirectional projections of the sensory systems and subcortical 
areas. Note that the thalamus is connected to the so-called neocortex of vision, 
audition, gustation, and somatosensation. Olfactory cortex is not neocortex. 
Enhanced activity in the sensory cortices is not perceptual 
experience per se (Ramachandran & Hirstein, 1997), but it makes 
perceptual experience more probable. We know that observers have 
lower auditory thresholds to aversively conditioned 1000 Hz tones 
(Chapter 4). The involvement of the amygdala would make a unique 
prediction about auditory thresholds during fear. The amygdala is 
neuronally tuned to high frequency auditory stimuli (Bordi & LeDoux, 
1994). Hence if fear influences auditory thresholds, this influence 
should be most obvious for high frequency sounds. Supporting data 
come from a recent experiment showing that avoidant motivational 
states lower auditory thresholds for 4000 Hz tones, but not for 1000 Hz 
tones (Chapter 4, Studies 4.1 and 4.2). 
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Is phenomenological experience of the avoidant emotions necessary? 
 The amygdala is a component involved in the processing of 
emotional stimuli; it is not a component involved in the feelings per se 
(Damasio et al., 2000; Reiman et al. 1997; Whalen, 1998; see also 
Feinstein, Adolphs, & Tranel, 2016). This observation was first made 
when researchers found that the amygdala was not activated when 
individuals were recalling emotional states but was activated when 
emotional stimuli were presented visually (Reiman et al. 1997). 
Subsequent research also revealed the absence of amygdala activation 
during the feeling of self-generated happiness, sadness, anger, and fear 
(Damasio et al. 2000).  
These findings lead to a unique prediction. Recall the sensory 
connections with subcortical regions in Figure 2. If the activation of the 
amygdala is necessary to potentiate sensory sensitivity, perceptual 
limits should be extended by emotion only if the emotion is triggered by 
some external stimuli, not when the emotion is self-generated (e.g., 
recalled fear). That is, the emotion stems from exogenous and not 
endogenous sources. In other words, enhanced perceptual capabilities 
may not necessarily require the phenomenological experience of the 
emotion. Some of the studies on perceptual limits reviewed here have 
triggered motivational/emotional states via visual stimuli such as 
fearful faces (Anderson, 2005; Bocanegra & Zeelenburg, 2011a, 2011b; 
Phelps et al. 2006; Sherman et al., 2012) or by somatosensory feedback 
(e.g., Chan et al., in-prep; Chapter 4), neither of which is known to 
reliably result in phenomenological feelings. The implication is that 
replication attempts in this area of research with emotion elicitation 
methods such as recall or vignettes may be futile, not because these 
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methods are possibly weaker, but because they do not involve the 
amygdala. 
 
Conclusions and Future Directions 
Our senses give us a representation of the external world in 
which we live. These representations are not only reflections of external 
reality, but perhaps are also reflections of our internal psychological 
states. In this review, we have put forward the notion that avoidant 
emotions extend perceptual limits. Here we have not only outlined 
several mechanisms at various levels of analysis to guide future 
research, but we have also showed how our work in olfaction and 
audition (Chapters 2 ‒ 4) is consistent with our theorizing.  
 So, do avoidant emotions extend perceptual limits? Based on the 
available evidence, the answer is “yes,” but not without constraints. For 
example, fear involves increased visual contrast sensitivity but only for 
low (Phelps et al., 2006) and not for high spatial frequency stimuli 
(Bocanegra & Zeelenberg, 2009). In addition, there are other kinds of 
perceptual limits (also Bialek, 1987), but whether they are affected by 
emotions has not been explored. Here we outline a few examples, and a 
caveat.  
Humans can see light with wavelengths from 380 nm to 750 nm, 
hear frequencies between 20-20000 Hz, localize sounds with a 
minimum audible angle (MAA) of 1˚ on the azimuth (Mills, 1958), and 
discriminate 1 trillion odors (Bushdid et al., 2014). We do not claim that 
emotions can influence all of these. Consider auditory localization as an 
example. A small MAA suggests that our auditory localization 
capabilities are already finely tuned. In combination with head turning 
(Perrett & Noble, 1997), it can help individuals to visually locate (and 
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possibly avoid) objects, accurately, and quickly. It is hard to conceive 
what further advantages an MAA smaller than 1 degree would bestow 
upon humans. Now compare this to odor and color discrimination 
abilities. Humans theoretically can discriminate between 1 trillion 
odors (Bushdid et al., 2014). Would there be a functional advantage to 
discriminate more than 1 trillion odors? Perhaps not. Might there be 
benefits to discriminate more than 2 million “colors”? Some species of 
birds, fish, amphibians, reptiles and insects can see about 100 million 
“colors” (Jordan, Deeb, Bosten, & Mollon, 2010) so there are probably 
advantages of such color perception abilities for them, but it is not clear 
what advantage there would be for humans. Our point is, it may be 
useful to consider what sort of evolutionary benefits might be conferred 
on an organism by extending a certain perceptual limit, as well as 
examining how the process changes during emotions and the possible 
proximal mechanisms involved. 
The evolutionary benefits of avoidant emotions extending 
perceptual limits are clear, but will approach emotions not achieve the 
same? In the fairy tale Little Red Riding Hood, when the girl questioned 
the large eyes and nose of her “grandmother” (the hungry wolf in 
disguise), the “grandmother” replied: “the better to see you”, “the better 
to hear you”, and so on. Humans have evolved better physiological 
features not only to avoid predation but also to approach rewards. As 
such, psychological mechanisms to enhance detection of rewards may 
also be present. However in Chan et al. (in-press; Chapter 2), it was 
clear that showing participants appetitive food pictures did not 
decrease olfactory thresholds to n-butanol. It is possible that approach 
emotions operate on more specific reward cues, whereas avoidant 
emotions operate on cues more indiscriminately (Chapter 3). In a 
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threatening situation, an organism would enhance survival by 
indiscriminately avoiding cues, but in a safe situation, there is only a 
limited number of cues that would enable the organism to flourish (e.g., 
ingestible food). Future directions might wish to consider priming 
appetitive emotions and assessing olfactory thresholds for specific 
reward cues such as isomyl acetate (banana scent). 
Many important questions remain unanswered. First, to what 
extent can we expect that avoidant emotions would extend perceptual 
limits in all modalities? To date, most research in this area has focused 
on vision; research regarding other modalities has started to emerge 
only recently. More research from various sensory domains is needed to 
provide a more conclusive answer. Another deserving question is to 
what extent, within a particular modality, can we generalize across 
stimuli? When testing visual contrast sensitivity, for example, existing 
research has used simple geometric shapes because these stimuli allow 
excellent experimental control. It remains an open question whether 
the results can be generalized to socially-relevant stimuli. Perhaps just 
as important is the question of which perceptual limits would be 
lowered. Within each modality, there could be multiple perceptual 
limits (see Appendix). Many other perceptual limits remain unexplored 
and this review is ripe to highlight opportunities for future research. 
Clearly more research needs to accrue for us to understand more 
holistically when and how avoidant emotions extend perceptual limits. 
We hope that this review is a fruitful step that would guide future 
research.  
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Appendix 
 
What are the possible perceptual limits? 
 Here, within each sensory modality, we first spell out what the 
possible perceptual limits are (see also Table 1). Note that although 
there are common concepts (e.g., threshold), some modalities will have 
unique concepts that apply only to themselves but not to others. This 
section is intended to be descriptive, not explanatory. Readers 
interested in the physiological or neural systems that support each 
system should refer to respective handbooks. 
 
Vision 
Within vision, there can be four possible perceptual limits: 
contrast sensitivity, spatial resolution, temporal resolution, and spectral 
sensitivity. Contrast sensitivity is the ability to differentiate between 
subtle shades, typically grey shades as in gabor patches. This concept is 
similar to threshold, but threshold in vision has a more traditional 
definition – the minimal light intensity that evokes a visual experience. 
Spatial resolution (acuity) is the ability to discriminate the smallest gaps 
present in the optotypes of Landolt shapes (in research setting), or 
letters using Snellen or Bailey-Lovie charts (in an optometry setting). 
Temporal resolution is the ability to resolve two images as occupying 
different timespace. For example, in a movie, the eyes technically “sees” 
sequences of discrete images but because the frame rate is higher than 
the temporal resolution of vision, we have a “smooth” visual experience 
of the movie; if the frame rate is lower, we experience “choppy” images. 
Often, we are not aware of each individual “choppy” images when they 
appear quick enough serially (rapid serial visual presentation). This 
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unawareness is also known as the attentional blink.  Spectral sensitivity 
refers to the range of wavelengths (390 nm to 700 nm) that the rods 
and cones in our eyes can detect, or the so-called “visible” spectrum. 
 
Audition 
 Within hearing, there can be three possible perceptual limits: 
threshold, frequency, temporal resolution, and localization. The 
threshold of hearing is the lowest intensity sound that produces an 
auditory experience. The human ear is tuned to frequencies between 20 
Hz to 20 kHz; tones outside these ranges are not perceived. The 
temporal resolution of hearing determines whether clicks presented at 
very quick succession would be perceived as one tone rather than two 
separate clicks; the fastest temporal resolution found was 10 μsec 
(Leschowitz, 1971). Auditory localization is the ability to determine 
where a sound is coming from. The auditory system localizes things in 
space based on the relative loudness between ears (interaural intensity 
difference) and relative time it takes for a sound to reach one ear before 
the other (interaural time difference). From these cues, researchers can 
also calculate the minimum distance between two sound sources on an 
azimuth for them to be perceived as occupying two different spatial 
locations (i.e., minimum auditory angle; Mills, 1958). Conceptually, the 
minimum auditory angle is comparable to the visual system’s spatial 
resolution.  
 
Olfaction 
 Within olfaction, there can be two possible perceptual limits: 
threshold and localization. The threshold of taste is the lowest 
concentration of odor molecules that is needed to trigger a smell 
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sensation. Olfactory localization (Porter et al. 2007) is the ability to 
determine sources of odors in space. Establishing a “minimum olfactory 
angle,” on the other hand, although possible in theory, is not possible in 
practice because of the erratic nature of molecular movement, even in 
enclosed spaces (i.e., Brownian motion).  
 
Somatosensation 
Within somatosensation, there can be three possible perceptual 
limits: threshold, spatial, and temporal resolution. Unlike the other 
sensory systems, there are four primary somatic submodalities: 
proprioception (the sense of positions of our bodies in space), tactile 
sensation (the sense elicited by nonpainful stimuli against the body 
surface), nociception (the sense elicited by noxious stimuli applied to 
the body), and temperature (the sense elicited by stimuli of a different 
temperature gradient than the body surface).  
Touch thresholds are more accurately conceived as touch-
pressure detection thresholds.  A touch threshold is the smallest 
amount of force pressed down onto the skin (e.g., using Semme-
Weinstein nylon filaments; Weinstein, 1993) that triggers that contact 
sensation. Spatial resolution in touch refers to the ability to resolve 
distances between two points by touch. This can further be divided into 
passive touch as in a two-point touch test, or active touch as in reading 
Braille letters (Lederman & Klatzky, 2009). Temporal sensitivity is the 
ability to judge whether pulses presented on the skin are separated in 
time.  
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Gustation 
Within gustation, there is one possible perceptual limit: 
threshold, the lowest concentration of tastant molecules needed to 
trigger a taste sensation. 
  
 41 
 
CHAPTER 2 
 
Disgust and Fear Lower Olfactory Threshold* 
Abstract 
Odors provide information regarding the chemical properties of 
potential environment hazards. Some of this information may be 
disgust-related (e.g., organic decay), whereas other information may be 
fear-related (e.g., smoke). Many studies have focused on how disgust 
and fear, as prototypical avoidant emotions, facilitate the detection of 
possible threats, but these studies have typically confined to the visual 
modality. Here, we examine how disgust and fear influence olfactory 
detection at a particular level—the level at which a subliminal olfactory 
stimulus crosses into conscious perception, also known as a detection 
threshold. Here, using psychophysical methods that allow us to test 
perceptual capabilities directly, we show that one way that disgust 
(Studies 2.1‒ 2.3) and fear (Study 2.3) facilitate detection is by lowering 
the amount of physical input that is needed to trigger a conscious 
experience of that input. This effect is particularly strong among 
individuals with high disgust sensitivity (Studies 2.2–2.3). Our research 
suggests that a fundamental way in which avoidant emotions foster 
threat detection is through lowering perceptual thresholds. 
                                                             
* This chapter is based on: Chan, K. Q., Holland, R. W., van Loon, R., Arts, R., & 
van Knippenberg, A. (in-press). Disgust and fear lower olfactory threshold. 
Emotion. 
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We rely on our sense of smell more often than we realize (Doty, 
2003; Herz, 2008). Indeed, when olfactory abilities are compromised, 
up to 75% of individuals have problems identifying spoiled food (Miwa 
et al., 2001; Temmel et al., 2002) and, consequently, up to 50% end up 
accidentally consuming it (Bonfils, Faulcon, Tavernier, Bonfils, & 
Malinvaud, 2008; Santos, Reiter, DiNardo, & Costanzo, 2004). Although 
human olfaction abilities are weak compared with those of some other 
animals such as dogs and rabbits, we are still able to recognize 
thousands of different scents, and we are sensitive to some compounds 
at minute concentrations. Enhanced smell sensitivity, the lowering of 
olfactory thresholds, may ensue from clinical disorders (Doty & 
Kimmelman, 1986) such as Addison’s disease, pituitary tumor growth, 
as well as from genetic polymorphisms (Keller, Zhuang, Chi, Vosshall, & 
Matsunami, 2007) and biochemical factors (Menashe et al., 2007; 
Mourad, Lejoyeux, & Adès, 1998; Navarrete-Palacios, Hudson, Reyes-
Guerrero, & Guevara-Guzmán, 2003). However, whether psychological 
states also impact olfactory thresholds has rarely been investigated. In 
fact, textbooks on olfactory psychophysics (e.g., Mather, 2011) and 
otorhinology (Hawkes, 2009) usually focus on how structural 
properties of physical stimuli (e.g., isomerism) influence thresholds, but 
have thus far neglected possible psychological influences. Here, we 
examine two avoidant emotions, disgust and fear, that may have the 
strongest influence on olfactory thresholds. 
 
Avoidant Emotions and Perceptual Vigilance 
Disgust and fear are prototypical avoidant emotions. They share 
functional and conceptual features, despite having different facial 
expressions, physiological markers (Ekman, Levenson, & Friesen, 1983; 
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but see Barrett, 2006), appraisal antecedents (Clore & Huntsinger, 
2007), and qualia. Disgust is a phenomenological feeling of revulsion at 
the prospect of incorporation of an offensive object (Rozin & Fallon, 
1987). This incorporation can be through the mouth (eating spoilt food), 
nose (airborne particles from someone’s sneeze), or skin (touching 
poop). Disgust is a key emotion in the behavioral immune system (Haidt, 
2008; Oaten, Stevenson, & Case, 2009; Rozin & Fallon, 1987; Schaller & 
Duncan, 2007), a suite of psychological mechanisms and behavioral 
responses to prevent infection. One way in which infection is prevented 
is for the perceptual system to be “comprised of mechanisms designed 
for detection [of pathogenic intruders]” (Schaller & Duncan, 2007, p. 
296). Fear is the phenomenological feeling that one’s body could be 
threatened or harmed in some way. Fear is a key emotion in the human 
threat management system (Neuberg, Kenrick, & Schaller, 2011), which 
comprises a constellation of mechanisms (especially the amygdala) that 
are sensitive to cues about possible threats and the stimuli that predict 
their occurrence (LeDoux, 1998). Hence, functionally, both disgust and 
fear enhance vigilance and motivate behavioral avoidance (Schaller & 
Duncan, 2007). Beyond functional similarities, some scholars have even 
argued that physical disgust—we do not examine moral disgust in this 
article—is conceptually similar to fear (S. W. S. Lee & Ellsworth, 2013). 
In addition, the clinical literature suggests that disgust sensitivity 
predicts contamination fears (Olatunji, Sawchuk, Lohr, & de Jong, 2004), 
and others have claimed that disgust elicitors can be characterized by 
their ability to elicit fear of oral incorporation (Marzillier & Davey, 
2004). 
One of the functional benefits of avoidant emotions is that they 
enhance perceptual vigilance at various levels. For example, negative 
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words are more likely to be correctly classified as negative when they 
are flashed quickly (Dijksterhuis & Aarts, 2003; see also Labiouse, 2004; 
and Dijksterhuis, Corneille, Aarts, Vermeulen, & Luminet, 2004); faces 
paired with negative social information lead to greater visual 
dominance than faces paired with positive social information 
(Anderson, Siegel, Bliss-Moreau, & Barrett, 2011); individuals with 
specific clinical phobias display greater cortical activity and attentional 
biases when confronted with their feared objects (see Richards, Benson, 
Donelly, & Hadwin, 2014, for a review). Furthermore, when primed 
with fear, (a) people rotate mental images faster (Borst, 2013), implying 
quicker object recognition (Jolicoeur, Corballis, & Lawson, 1998); (b) 
have better visual spatial acuity (Bocanegra & Zeelenberg, 2009, 2011a); 
and (c) faster temporal resolution (Bocanegra & Zeelenberg, 2011b). 
Disgust and/or fear have also been found to affect a particular 
aspect of perceptual vigilance, contrast sensitivity. Contrast sensitivity 
concerns the difference in luminance between the target and the 
background that is required to see a target reliably (Pelli & Bex, 2013). 
In one set of studies, Phelps, Ling, and Carrasco (2006) found that 
individuals are more accurate in judging the orientation of faint-gray 
gabor patches when these stimuli were preceded by fear (vs. neutral) 
faces. In another study, Sherman, Haidt, and Clore (2012) found that 
individuals high in disgust sensitivity have better visual contrast 
sensitivity when individuals were primed with disgust stimuli (e.g., 
trash can). Interestingly, Sherman and colleagues also showed similar 
lower contrast thresholds for participants who were primed with fear 
pictures (see also Phelps et al., 2006). These and other studies reviewed 
thus far reveal a common theme: Avoidant emotions enhance 
perceptual processing, which is functional because the emotions 
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increase the chances that an encountered target becomes detected, 
identified, and, ultimately, for appropriate behaviors to be enacted 
(Keller, 2014; see also Stevenson, 2009a). However, these studies have 
examined only vision, whereas enhanced perceptual vigilance should 
extend beyond vision. In the current research, we examine the influence 
of disgust and fear, as two particular avoidant emotions, on olfactory 
threshold, the lowest amount of physical input that is needed to trigger 
a conscious experience of that input (Fechner, 1860/1966).7 The main 
reason behind this particular proposed extension is that some of the 
functions served by disgust and fear fit well with that of olfaction. Next 
we examine each separately. 
 
The Overlapping Functions of Olfaction, Disgust, and Fear 
The functions of disgust and fear fit well with some of the main 
functions of olfaction. Numerous attempts have been made to identify 
and categorize the functions of the human olfactory system. Smells 
carry information about substances, and one important function of 
olfaction is to provide information about the chemical composition of 
substances before we come into closer contact with them. 
In one prominent analysis, Stevenson (2010) classified the 
functions of olfaction as relating to (a) ingestion, and (b) avoiding 
environmental hazards.8 Disgust plays an important role in shaping 
                                                             
7 This definition is similar to that of contrast sensitivity. Conceptually, for any target 
signal to be detected, it must be contrasted against a background signal (e.g., other 
background odors, neural noise). Traditionally, contrast sensitivity is a term used 
only in vision because the word “contrast” refers to luminance (Pelli & Bex, 2013), 
whereas threshold is a term used for any modality (including vision, e.g., “contrast 
threshold sensitivity”). Mathematically, threshold is the reciprocal of sensitivity. 
8 Stevenson (2010) also identified social communication as the third function of 
olfaction. Others have claimed navigation as the primary function of olfaction 
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food choices (Rozin, Haidt, McCauley, & Imada, 1997). Researchers 
showed that odors are often used (along with other cues) to judge 
whether something should be considered a food or not before (Rozin, 
Fallon, & Augustoni-Ziskind, 1985) or after (through retronasal 
olfaction; Stevenson, 2009b; Verhagen & Engelen, 2006) ingestion. For 
example, some individuals reject eating cheese because of its peculiar 
smell (before or after ingesting it), although cheese is safe for 
consumption. Aside from ingestion, odors may also signal the presence 
of two categories of environmental hazards. The first category relates to 
microbial threats (e.g., organic decay, feces, vomit), for which disgust 
plays a strong role. Indeed, exposure to these threats often produces 
strong feelings of disgust. Therefore, an important function of disgust is 
to reduce the probability of physical contact with pathogens (Tybur, 
Lieberman, Kurzban, & DeScioli, 2013; see also Curtis, Aunger, & Rabie, 
2004, and Curtis & Biran, 2001). The other category relates to 
nonmicrobial threats (e.g., predators, smoke, gas leaks), which are more 
strongly linked to fear. Because disgust, fear, and olfaction share 
functional features, and because disgust and fear are avoidant emotions, 
we hypothesized that disgust and fear lower olfactory threshold. 
To our best knowledge, research has not yet shown how disgust 
and fear experiences relate to olfactory sensitivity, although there are 
common links between disgust, fear, and olfaction based on their 
respective functions. We acknowledge that there have been some claims 
that disgust increases olfactory sensitivity (Rozin et al., 1986; Skarlicki, 
Hoegg, Aquino, & Nadisic, 2013). However, the conceptualization of 
sensitivity was often muddled with emotional reactivity (the “Yuck!” 
                                                                                                                                              
(Jacobs, 2012). But because these functions are not central to our discussion on 
disgust and fear, we do not discuss them here. 
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response) or cognitive judgments of stimulus intensity (“How intense is 
this smell?”) rather than the kind of psychophysical perceptual 
capability (i.e., detection thresholds) that we seek to examine in this 
research. Thus, it is still unclear whether disgust influences olfactory 
sensitivity. 
 
The Present Research 
Using psychophysical methods, we performed three 
experiments to test the effect of avoidant emotions on olfactory 
detection threshold. In the first two experiments, we sought to establish 
whether disgust influences olfactory threshold. We chose to examine 
disgust first because the function of disgust seems to fit more closely 
with the nature of olfaction. Humans detect smells mostly at short 
ranges, usually at distances shorter than a couple of meters. Certainly, 
smells produced by hazards such as pathogens cannot travel far 
distances (Tybur et al., 2013), although there are exceptions, like big 
fires. These are the environmental conditions that typically may elicit 
disgust (note that here we are not concerned with moral disgust). At 
longer distances, sound and sight may, at least for humans, be more 
important as primary sources of information concerning avoidance. 
Thus, for the elicitation of fear, vision and hearing may be even more 
informative than smell. In short, that is why we presume that there 
could be a more intimate link between smell and disgust than between 
smell and fear. Therefore, the effects of disgust on olfaction threshold 
will be studied first. 
In the third experiment, we also tested the effect of fear on 
olfactory thresholds to investigate the relative influence of disgust and 
fear on olfaction sensitivity. Finding that disgust (but not fear) 
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decreases olfactory threshold would indicate a function-specific 
influence; that is, emotions influence sensory processes only when the 
functions of the emotion most closely match that of the sensory 
modality. However, if fear likewise decreases olfactory threshold, this 
would point to a more generic view that avoidant emotions decrease 
threshold. Such a view is compatible with the behavioral immune 
system because the behavioral immune system can itself be 
conceptualized as part of a larger “human threat management system” 
(Neuberg et al., 2011). 
 
Study 2.1 
In a within-participants manipulation, participants were shown 
pictures to induce the emotions disgust, appetite, and a neutral 
emotional state. Appetite was chosen as a comparison condition to 
ensure that any effect on threshold is specific to disgusting food, not just 
food in general. 
 
Method 
Participants and Design 
Thirty-nine participants9 (Mage = 24.3 years, SDage = 7.3) took 
part in an experiment allegedly about the “effects of odors on memory.” 
They received either course credits or €7.50 (US$8.50) as remuneration. 
Participants reported having no smell abnormalities on the day of 
testing, and they complied with our requirements of not smoking, 
eating, or drinking (except plain water) 2 hr before the experiment. 
                                                             
9 For all experiments, we originally aimed to recruit at least 34 participants, based 
on 80% power, α = .05, d = 0.5, in a within-participants design, and until the week 
for conducting the experiment was over (stopping rule). 
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Emotion was manipulated in blocks as a within-participants factor, with 
the neutral condition always as the first block administered, and the 
order of the two other blocks was counterbalanced. The design was a 3 
(emotion: disgust vs. appetite vs. neutral) × 2 (order of emotion 
condition: appetite as second block and disgust as third block vs. 
disgust as second block and appetite as third block) design. The latter 
factor was between participants. 
 
Setup and Procedure 
The physical setup is illustrated in Figure 1. Participants sat 
front-facing the monitor (A) and experimenters sat at (B). This 
configuration ensured that experimenters were blind to the condition 
because they could not see what the current stimulus on the 
participants’ screen was. On the left (C), the full battery of Sniffin’ Sticks 
(Hummel, Sekinger, Wolf, Pauli, & Kobal, 1997), which consists of the 
threshold, discrimination, and identification sets, were displayed. Only 
the threshold set was tested. Because the cover story was about the 
“effects of odors on memory,” participants would expect many odors to 
be tested. Therefore, in order to bolster the cover story, the 
discrimination and identification sets were also present to give the 
impression that different smells were being tested. 
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Figure 1. The physical setup of the experiment. Participants sat at A, facing the 
monitor, while the experimenter sat at B. This configuration ensured that the 
experimenters could not see what the participant was seeing on the monitor. 
Sniffin’ Sticks were placed at C. 
 
While assessing their olfactory threshold, we manipulated 
participants’ emotional state by showing emotion-inducing pictures of 
rotten food (35 disgusting pictures), palatable food (32 appetite-
inducing pictures), or office stationery (33 neutral pictures). 
Participants wore their blindfolds whenever they had to sniff the sticks, 
and took them off when they had to view the pictures. A separate 
sample of 20 participants validated that the disgust stimuli were more 
disgusting than the neutral stimuli, paired samples t(19) = 8.17, p = .001, 
and the palatable food stimuli were less disgusting than the neutral 
stimuli, paired samples t(19) = 2.28, p = .03. Hence, this is strong 
evidence that our emotion manipulation was successful in the actual 
experiment (see also the pilot test in Study 2.3). 
We followed Hummel et al.’s (1997) procedure closely. At the 
start of each block, the experimenter let participants sniff Stick #14, a 
B 
A 
C 
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concentration way above a normal person’s threshold, and told the 
participant that this was the quality of the scent they had to identify. 
The rest of the procedure is outlined in Figure 2. On each trial, two 
pictures were shown (each for 3 s), followed by two rounds of olfactory 
threshold assessment (Pollatos et al., 2007) using the Sniffin’ Sticks (see 
Figure 3). The threshold battery of the Sniffin’ Sticks consists of 16 
triplets of smell tubes. Each triplet includes one tube containing a target 
odorant (n-butanol) in progressive dilution steps of 2, starting from a 
concentration of 0.04 n-butanol (Stick #1) to 1.2 × 106 (Stick #16) n-
butanol.10 On each round of the threshold assessment, participants were 
presented with three sticks from the same triplet in random order. Only 
one of the sticks (the target stick) contained the odorant, whereas the 
other two sticks were blanks. Participants had to indicate which of the 
three sticks smelled differently. In verbatim, our script was as follows: 
“This is Stick 1. [Participant sniffs once.] This is Stick 2. [Participant 
sniffs once.] This is Stick 3. [Participant sniffs once.] Which smells 
different: Stick 1, 2, or 3?”  
If the response was incorrect, the next triplet would contain a 
target stick of a higher odorant concentration. On subsequent triplets, 
the target stick’s odorant concentration increased step-by-step until a 
correct identification occurred. In that case, the next triplet contained a 
target stick of lower concentration (a reversal of the staircase). A 
subsequent correct response would lead to further lowering of the 
target stimulus concentration, whereas an incorrect response would be 
followed by an increase of concentration (a new reversal). This 
procedure was repeated until seven reversal points were obtained, 
                                                             
10 The general equation is yk = 0.04(21-k), where y is the concentration of n-butanol 
at dilution step k. 
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which concluded one experimental block. The mean of the last four 
staircase reversal points constituted the threshold measure. Scores 
ranged from 1 (lowest sensitivity/highest threshold) to 16 (highest 
sensitivity/lowest threshold). The assessment lasted about 10 min on 
average.  
When a block ended, two tasks followed: (a) a memory test, 
which helped bolster the cover story; and (b) a filler task. In the 
memory test, a collage of 25 pictures was presented and participants 
had to indicate which pictures had not been presented earlier. In the 
filler task, participants had to identify faint numbers by pressing the 
corresponding number on their keyboard. The numbers were presented 
against a white background and had starting RGB values of 255, 255, 
255 that progressively darkened at -1 RGB/s. The task lasted 5 min. 
This task was initially also intended to be a conceptual replication of 
Sherman et al. (2012). However, because the digits could not be 
incrementally darkened consistently at -1 RGB/s (sometimes the RGB 
decrements took more than 1 s), the results of this task have poor 
construct validity and will not be published. Nevertheless, we retained 
this filler task in subsequent experiments because it served its primary 
purpose as a filler task well. 
Demographic information (age, sex, medical olfactory-related 
information) was gathered at the end of the experiment. Participants 
were finally thanked and fully debriefed. 
 
Results 
The olfactory threshold data were subjected to a 3 (emotion: 
disgust vs. appetite vs. neutral) × 2 (order: appetite vs. disgust as 
second block) mixed analysis of variance (ANOVA). There was a main 
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effect of Emotion, F(2, 74) = 10.41, p = .001, ηp2 = .22. Posthoc tests 
revealed that the threshold in the disgust condition was lower 
compared with the neutral condition, t(38) = 4.41, p = .001, d = .71, and 
appetite condition, t(38) = 3.24, p = .003, d = 0.52. Thresholds in the 
neutral and appetite conditions did not differ significantly, t(38) = 0.23, 
p = .98, d = .01. Results are presented in Table 1. We also found a main 
effect of order, F(1, 37) = 4.89, p = .03, ηp2 = .12, in which thresholds of 
all blocks were lower in Order 1 (appetite as second block) than in 
Order 2 (disgust as second block), despite random assignment. 
Importantly, there was no significant two-way interaction between 
order and emotion, F(2, 74) = .28, p = .76, ηp2 = .008, implying that order 
did not affect the contrasts between the emotion conditions. Separate 
tests of the emotion condition effects within order conditions revealed 
that the effect was significant within each order (both ps < .05). 
 
Discussion 
We obtained initial evidence that disgust lowers olfactory 
threshold, and this effect is not simply because of seeing food-related 
stimuli. Although a main effect of order was found, order of emotion 
conditions did not affect our main finding concerning the effect of 
disgust on olfactory thresholds. Two potential alternative 
interpretations of the findings of Study 2.1 should be mentioned. First, 
the neutral block always being first may have compromised the 
obtained effect (e.g., because of learning or habituation effects). It is 
therefore important to counterbalance the order of experimental 
conditions. Second, although the experimenters could not see the 
primes on participants’ monitor during the experiment, it is possible 
that participants’ facial or vocal cues revealed the conditions 
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participants were currently in. This knowledge could trigger a bias in 
the experimenters, who could then, consciously or not, have altered 
their way of executing the olfactory test (e.g., by presenting target sticks 
for longer periods or closer to the nostrils). In our second experiment, 
we aimed to rule out both alternative explanations. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Outline of procedure. Participants’ olfactory thresholds were assessed 
intermittently during the emotional manipulation in a two-picture primes 
followed by two runs of the threshold triplets procedure. This procedure was 
repeated until a stable threshold was reached. Thereafter, to allow for a period 
of rest, an alleged memory test and a filler task were administered. 
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        Triplet #1      Triplet #16 
 
 
 
Figure 3. The Sniffin’ Sticks threshold battery. The Sniffin’ Sticks threshold 
battery consists of 16 ordered triplets of sticks. Each triplet is comprised of one 
stick with the target odorant (n-butanol) and two sticks with neutral odorant. 
While blindfolded, participants have to discriminate between the odorous stick 
(red) and the neutral ones (green and blue), starting with Triplet #16. The 
target odor concentration doubles across each dilution step. At a certain 
dilution step, the target odorant would cross a sensory threshold and become 
just distinguishable from the neutral odorants. The concentration of the target 
odorant is the weakest in Triplet #16 and strongest in Triplet #1. The lowest 
dilution step at which participants can consistently discriminate the target 
from the blanks is the threshold.  
 
Study 2.2 
In this experiment, we counterbalanced the order of the neutral 
and disgust blocks, and videotaped the session in order to investigate 
whether target sticks were presented for longer periods or closer to the 
nostrils during the disgust blocks. Because disgust primes may be 
especially influential for individuals high in disgust sensitivity 
(Sherman et al., 2012)—the tendency to experience disgust (Olatunji et 
al., 2007)—we added disgust sensitivity (Disgust Scale–Revised; DS-R; 
Haidt, McCauley & Rozin, 1994, modified by Olatunji et al., 2007) as a 
predictor. 
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Table 1.  
Mean Dilution Step (SDs) by Condition 
Note. Means that do not share the same superscript within a row differ 
significantly at p ≤ .05. Neu = neutral; App = appetite; Dis = disgust. 
 
Method 
Participants and Design 
Thirty-nine participants (Mage = 21.7; SDage = 6.3) participated 
for course credits or €5 (US$5.60). The design was a 2 (emotion: disgust 
vs. neutral) × 2 (order: disgust first vs. neutral first) × Disgust 
Sensitivity (continuous factor) mixed-participants design, with Emotion 
as the within-participant factor and Order and Disgust sensitivity as 
between-participants factors. 
 
Procedure 
The procedure was identical to that of Study 2.1 except for four 
aspects. First, the appetitive block was removed from the design. 
Second, the order of the neutral and disgust blocks were now 
counterbalanced. Third, a video recorder was placed at the left side of 
the participants’ face (90° angle) at 1.5 m distance in order to record 
 Neutral Appetite Disgust 
Order 1: 
NeuAppDis 
6.50 (1.68)a 6.38 (1.98)a 7.99 (2.28)b 
Order 2: 
NeuDisApp 
7.69 (1.41)a 7.83 (2.63)a 8.84 (1.93)b 
Average across 
Orders 
7.11 (1.66)a 7.18 (2.25)a 8.42 (2.12)b 
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duration and distance of target stick presentation. Fourth, participants 
completed the Dutch version of the DS-R (Van Overveld, de Jong, Peters, 
& Schouten, 2011) after the filler task of the last experimental block. 
The overall alpha reliability of the questionnaire was .85. 
 
Results 
The threshold data were subjected to a 2 (emotion: disgust vs. 
neutral) × 2 (order: disgust first vs. neutral first) × Disgust Sensitivity 
(continuous) mixed ANOVA. The analysis revealed a main effect of 
emotion, replicating the findings of Study 2.1, such that the mean 
threshold was lower in the disgust than in the neutral condition, F(1, 37) 
= 4.60, p = .03, ηp2 = .11. This effect of emotion was qualified by an 
interaction with disgust sensitivity, F(1, 37) = 6.51, p = .01, ηp2 = .15. 
Results are plotted in Figure 4. Compared with the neutral condition, 
planned contrasts revealed that thresholds in the disgust condition 
were lower for individuals high in disgust sensitivity (+1 SD; p = .003), 
but did not differ for those low in disgust sensitivity (-1 SD; p = .64). 
There was no main effect of disgust sensitivity, F(1, 37) = .02, p = .87, d 
= .001. The Emotion × Order × Disgust sensitivity interaction was not 
significant, F(2, 36) = 3.30, p = .07, ηp2 = .08. Although this interaction 
failed to reach significance, we nevertheless probed further in view of 
its relevance to the alternative interpretation of the neutral condition 
always being first in Study 2.1. When disgust was the first block (Order 
1), there was a marginal effect of emotion, F(1, 21) = 4.10, p = .06, and a 
significant Emotion × Disgust sensitivity interaction, F(1, 21) = 4.83, p 
= .04. Hence, the neutral condition always being first could not have 
been responsible for the fact that we found a lower olfactory threshold 
in the disgust condition compared with the neutral condition in Study 
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2.1. However, when neutral was the first block (Order 2) in Study 2.2, 
there was no main effect of emotion (as we obtained in the same order 
in Study 2.1), and neither was there an Emotion × Disgust sensitivity 
interaction, Fs(1, 14) < 1. The nonsignificant main effect of Emotion in 
Order 2—the very order we found a main effect of Emotion in Study 
2.1—was likely because participants in Order 2 had lower disgust 
sensitivity scores (M = 2.82, SD = .63) than those in Order 1 (M = 3.25, 
SD = .40), t(37) = 2.40, p = .02. 
For the video coding, eight participants withdrew their consent 
for the video recording and two footages were lost because the video 
recorder overheated during the session. For the remaining footages, 
two coders (an independent research assistant not involved in running 
the experiment and the first author) independently coded all trials on 
two indices: (a) the duration each stick was under the nostril (the 
coders read off Windows Media Player’s “elapse timeline” the number 
of seconds between the moment each stick was under participants’ 
nostrils and the time it was taken away), and (b) the distance of each 
stick from the nostril (coders used a ruler to measure the screen 
distance between the tip of the stick and the nostril). Between emotion 
conditions, no significant differences were found for duration, F(1, 28) 
= .17, p = .68, or distance, F(1, 28) = .47, p = .50. Disgust sensitivity also 
did not interact with either duration or distance between the emotion 
conditions, Fs(1, 28) = .60, p = .64. Therefore, our results were unlikely 
because of experimenter biases. 
 
Discussion 
With a counterbalanced disgust–neutral block order, we found 
that priming disgust lowers olfactory thresholds, particularly among 
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individuals who have high disgust sensitivity. Importantly, order of 
emotion block (i.e., the neutral block always being first in Study 2.1) 
could not have caused the emotion effect, because in Study 2.2 we 
obtained the same effect with the disgust block being first. 
Unexpectedly, the disgust effect observed in Study 2.1 (i.e., lower 
olfaction thresholds with disgust primes than with neutral primes) was 
not replicated in Study 2.2 with the neutral block measured first. We 
aim to replicate the latter effect in Study 2.3. Considering the absence of 
effects of emotion conditions on duration and distance of target stick 
presentations in our video footages, there was no evidence of 
experimenter biases in the reported effects of emotions on olfactory 
thresholds. In Study 2.3, we sought to replicate our main findings again, 
and also to explore the generality of the disgust-threshold effect to 
another emotion: fear. 
 
Study 2.3 
Disgust is an avoidant emotion that has evolutionary roots in 
ingestion and avoiding environmental hazards (Stevenson, 2010). Is 
disgust capable of lowering olfaction thresholds because of its unique 
relation to smell, or does it share this capability with other avoidant 
emotions, such as fear? Even though disgust and fear may have different 
qualia, they are conceptually (S. W. S. Lee & Ellsworth, 2013; Marzillier 
& Davey, 2004; Olatunji, Haidt, McKay, & David, 2008) and functionally 
(Schaller & Duncan, 2007) related, and also share similar neurological 
substrates (Klucken et al., 2012). Hence, in this experiment, we 
contrasted disgust with fear and neutral emotion. 
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Method 
Participants and Design 
Thirty-seven participants (Mage = 25.9, SDage = 7.1) participated 
for course credits or €7.50 (US$8.50). The design was a 3 × 2 design, 
with Emotion (disgust vs. fear) as a within-participants factor, and 
Order (disgust vs. fear as second block) and Disgust Sensitivity 
(continuous factor) as between-participants factors. As in Study 2.1, the 
neutral block was first. 
 
Materials and Procedure 
The materials used for the disgust and neutral conditions were 
identical to those of Studies 2.1 and 2.2. The overall alpha reliability of 
the DS-R was .84. The neutral block was administered first, and the 
order of the other two blocks was counterbalanced. To induce fear, we 
presented pictures of fear stimuli (e.g., gunpoint). Thirty-seven fear 
pictures were used. A pilot test with a separate sample of 27 
participants rated fearful, disgust, and neutral pictures on fear, 
pleasantness, and arousal. The fear pictures elicited greater fear, F(2, 26) 
= 37.2, p < .001, and were less pleasant, F(2, 26) = 16.8, p < .001, than 
the disgust pictures, which in turn elicited more fear than the neutral 
pictures, F(2, 26) = 12.04, p = .002, and were less pleasant than the 
neutral pictures, F(2, 26) = 120.1, p < .001. In addition, fear pictures did 
not lead to differences in arousal from the disgust pictures, F(2, 26) 
= .46, p = .50, although both of them elicited more arousal than neutral 
pictures, F(2, 26) = 6.88, p = .01. Hence, our emotion induction was 
successful. 
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Results 
The threshold data were subjected to a 3 (emotion: disgust vs. 
fear vs. neutral) × 2 (order: disgust vs. fear as second block) × Disgust 
Sensitivity (continuous) mixed ANOVA. There was a main effect of 
emotion, F(2, 72) = 5.79, p = .005, ηp2 = .14. Planned contrasts revealed 
that disgust lowered olfactory threshold compared with neutral (p 
= .002, d = 0.55). Fear, compared with neutral, also lowered olfactory 
threshold (p = .05, d = 0.33), whereas thresholds in the disgust and fear 
condition did not differ (p = .22, d = .21). In addition, this main effect 
was qualified by an interaction with disgust sensitivity, F(2, 70) = 3.23, 
p = .04, ηp2 = .08. Individuals low in disgust sensitivity (-1 SD) did not 
differ in their threshold as a function of emotion (ps > .23), whereas the 
disgust and fear primes increasingly lowered thresholds as disgust 
sensitivity increased (see Figure 4B), such that for individuals high in 
disgust sensitivity (+1 SD), thresholds after disgust and fear primes 
significantly differed from neutral (both ps < .001). No effects involving 
order or disgust sensitivity were found (Fs < 2.34, ps > .11). 
Nevertheless, we further investigated whether disgust thresholds were 
lower in either order and found that, like in Study 2.1, disgust 
thresholds were lower in either order (Fs > 4.42, ps < .05). 
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A 
 
B 
 
Figure 4. Mean (SD) dilution step at threshold value as a function of 
emotional manipulation in Studies 2.2 (Panel A) and 2.3 (Panel B). Higher 
dilution steps scores imply lower thresholds. Error bars represent standard 
errors. 
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Discussion 
We again found that disgust lowered olfactory threshold, 
particularly for individuals with high disgust sensitivity. Similar effects 
on threshold were observed in the fear condition. This is probably 
because disgust and fear are both avoidant emotions—both promote 
vigilance in the organism. Furthermore, disgust sensitivity correlates 
strongly with trait anxiety and specific fears (e.g., McDonald, Hartman, 
& Vrana, 2008; Muris, Merckelbach, Schmidt, & Tierney, 1999).  
Although it is unsurprising that disgust sensitivity moderated 
the effect of disgust on threshold, it may seem strange that disgust 
sensitivity also moderated the effect of both on olfactory threshold. One 
possibility is that disgust sensitivity—as a theoretical construct—
relates strongly to anxiety and specific fears (McDonald et al., 2008; 
Muris et al., 1999). Trait anxiety can also modulate the effect of disgust 
primes on brain activity (Schienle, Schäfer, Stark, Walter, & Vaitl, 2005). 
Because of the shared variances, functionality, and conceptualization 
between disgust sensitivity and trait fear, it may not be surprising that 
disgust sensitivity also interacted with fear primes. The second 
possibility is that the DS-R was not solely measuring disgust but was 
also measuring general threat sensitivity. This is because (a) the DS-R 
contained items that do not straightforwardly relate to disgust (e.g., 
aversion to walking through graveyards), (b) the labels of the scale 
asked participants how “anxious” or “bothered” they were by certain 
events, and (c) the DS-R are more strongly related to neuroticism and 
emotionality (Olatunji et al., 2008). To pinpoint the exact role disgust 
sensitivity plays, future research may use other scales that also measure 
disgust sensitivity (e.g., the three-domain Disgust Scale; Tybur et al., 
2009). 
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General Discussion 
In sum, we found that disgust lowered olfactory thresholds 
(Studies 2.1–2.3). We found similar effects of fear (Study 2.3), probably 
because both fear and disgust are avoidant emotions tuned toward 
perceptual vigilance (see also Sherman et al., 2012). The threshold 
detection advantage in neutral versus disgust states across all 
experiments is 20.94 = 1.92; for neutral versus fear, it is 20.70 = 1.62 (see 
Supplementary Materials S1 and S2). Furthermore, these effects are 
particularly evident for individuals with high disgust sensitivity and 
absent among individuals with low disgust sensitivity. Our findings are 
important because previous research has postulated (e.g., Levenson, 
1999), but not investigated, the link between disgust and perceptual 
sensitivity (except Sherman et al., 2012). At a more abstract level, 
because disgust is a key emotion behind the behavioral immune system, 
we have also shown that one way in which the behavioral immune 
system (Schaller & Duncan, 2007) works in detecting threats is by 
altering fundamental perceptual capabilities. Extending beyond the 
behavioral immune system, because fear is a key emotion in the human 
threat management system (Neuberg et al., 2011), we have also shown 
a part of how the human threat management system works. 
One might wonder whether there is a theoretical contradiction 
between our conclusions on disgust increasing olfactory sensitivity and 
the functions of disgust facial expressions (e.g., wrinkling nose, narrow 
brows), which serves to restrict further inputs (D. H. Lee, Mirza, 
Flanagan, & Anderson, 2014). However, the qualia of an emotion often 
outlast its facial expression. Therefore, any facial expression causing the 
restriction of input—which inevitably increases thresholds—may 
happen only upon the initial encounter with the trigger when the 
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expression is present. Over an extended period of time (e.g., the 
duration of our threshold task), when the expression subsides, the 
predominating function served by disgust may lower thresholds. 
We claimed that avoidant emotions improve olfactory detection, 
but for an avoidant emotion (e.g., disgust) to be triggered, one might 
argue that the trigger (e.g., foul smell) needs to be detected in the first 
place. Hence, on the surface, this appears to be the classic “chicken-and-
egg problem”: How would one happen without the other first happening? 
For our theory to be logically coherent, it is important to qualify that the 
trigger of an avoidant emotion and the outcome to be detected are two 
separate entities. It would be logically incoherent to claim that seeing 
images of thrash would improve visual detection of trash. However, it 
would be logically coherent to claim that seeing images of thrash would 
improve olfactory detection of thrash (see also Supplemental Materials 
S2). 
Several alternative explanations might be considered. First, one 
might argue that our findings were because of mere negative valence 
induced by emotional states. However, this is unlikely because 
individuals in a depressive state (as an example of negative emotional 
condition) typically have higher olfactory thresholds (Pollatos et al., 
2007; Schablitzky & Pause, 2014). Second, one might argue that our 
findings were because of response bias, in which participants simply 
tended to report smelling something when they did not. Such response 
biases may occur in paradigms in which, after the presentation of each 
odorant (or blank), participants are asked to indicate whether they 
detected an odor or not. However, because the present threshold 
procedure is a task in which participants indicate which of the sticks 
contained the target odorant (a triple-alternative forced-choice 
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paradigm), such response bias cannot exist (Macmillan & Creelman, 
1991). The Sniffin’ Sticks thus yields an unbiased measure of olfactory 
threshold. Third, one might argue that our findings were simply the 
effect of increased arousal when experiencing disgust or fear, rather 
than avoidant emotions per se. Without examining other emotions (e.g., 
nonavoidant negative emotions), our experiments cannot conclusively 
demonstrate that the lowered threshold was specific only to avoidant 
emotions and not highly arousing emotions per se. However, it is 
unlikely that our effects were simply because of arousal, because in 
Study 2.1, when we presented arousing tasty food stimuli (in the 
appetitive condition), olfactory threshold did not differ between this 
condition and the neutral condition, and threshold differed between the 
appetitive condition and disgust condition. Fourth, it is possible that 
participants sniffed harder (inhaled more volume of air) in some 
conditions, but this is unlikely to affect our results. Some participants 
indeed sniffed harder, but only for the first few sticks at the beginning 
of the experiment. Whenever that happened, our research assistants 
reminded participants to sniff normally. All participants complied. To 
reiterate, the first few sticks are not counted toward the threshold 
calculation. (Threshold was calculated from the last four reversals.) 
Nevertheless, without a spirometer, we cannot rule out the possibility 
that participants may have sniffed harder on some trials (sticks) 
without our assistants noticing.  
One might wonder whether our effects were because of 
attention, because attention is known to increase sensitivity across 
sensory modalities (e.g., Carrasco, 2006). External attention refers to 
the selection and modulation of sensory information (Chun, Golomb, & 
Turk-Browne, 2011). Our procedure controls for external attention 
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(spatial, temporal, and object-based attention; Keller, 2011) because 
participants knew where to sniff, when to sniff, and what type of scent 
they were supposed to detect. Hence, it is unlikely that our results were 
because of external attention. Internal attention, on the other hand, 
refers to the selection, modulation, and maintenance of internally 
generated information, such as task rules, responses, long-term 
memory, or working memory. Internal attention includes cognitive 
control processes and operates over representations in working 
memory, long-term memory, task rules, decisions, and responses (Chun 
et al., 2011). In our paradigm, after every sniff, participants had to store 
neural representations of the current scent in working memory, 
compare this new memory representation with the one that was 
previously stored, decide whether the current scent was the same as the 
stored scent, inhibit competing representations, and so on. These 
processes involve cognitive control (Chun et al., 2011), which itself is 
increased under avoidant states (Koch, Holland, & van Knippenberg, 
2008). Therefore, future research may wish to explicate the role 
internal attention and its components play. 
The odor used in the present threshold measurement was n-
butanol, which is commonly used for assessing olfactory thresholds. N-
butanol is regarded as a “neutral” scent and smells like whiteboard 
marker ink (Hummel et al., 1997). It still has to be established whether 
our effects depend on the qualitative nature of particular scents. If the 
perceptual system is optimally tuned to different kinds of olfactory 
threats, then this ability may be enhanced by emotions most fitting with 
the kind of threat. For example, disgust may lower olfactory thresholds 
even more acutely for smells indicative of microbial threats (see Olsson 
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et al., 2014), whereas the same goes for fear and nonmicrobial threats 
(e.g., smoke). Future research may wish to investigate this. 
Our olfactory system is already well-tuned to detect possible 
threats via smells (Doty, 2003; Herz, 2008). The so-called “absolute 
thresholds” for more than 500 odors have already been determined in 
past research (Devos, Patte, Rouault, Lafort, & van Gemert, 1990). This 
may have misleadingly suggested that olfactory thresholds are 
immutable—that thresholds represent the limit of human olfactory 
performance. However, the present research shows that what we 
interpreted as “absolute thresholds” may not be as absolute as we think. 
It appears that functionally relevant emotions such as disgust and fear 
enhance our smell capabilities to the extent that they allow us to detect 
odors at substantially lower concentrations than we normally are able 
to do.  
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Supplementary Material  
 
S1: Computing a detection advantage across all experiments 
 
Consider the two threshold values, yneutral and ydisgust, that were 
measured in all three experiments. The ratio of this difference is: 
𝑦neutral 
𝑦disgust 
=  
0.04(21−dilution step of neutral) 
0.04(21−dilution step of disgust)
 
  
This equation simplifies to: 
𝑦neutral 
𝑦disgust 
=  2(−dilution step of neutral + dilution step of disgust) 
  
Or simply: 
𝑦neutral 
𝑦disgust 
=  2(difference in dilution steps between disgust and neutral) 
 
 
S2: An example of the detection advantage in real life 
Thresholds can also be meaningfully related to the physical 
world by computing a detection advantage, as shown above. The 
detection advantage across three experiments can then be further 
interpreted using real-life quantities, for example, in the time taken to 
detect the odor. We illustrate the potential implications by using the 
example of the detection of a gas leak. Suppose there is a gas leak from a 
pipe that releases 1 cubic unit of methanethiol per second. Assume that 
the threshold of detecting methanethiol is 20 cubic units in an 
affectively neutral state. With a 1.62 detection advantage during a 
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fearful state, 12.3 cubic units would be needed to detect methanethiol. 
See Figure 5 below. It will take 20 seconds to detect methanethiol in an 
affectively neutral state (TN), and only 12.3 seconds in a fearful state 
(TF). This extra 7.7 seconds can be life-saving. Care must be taken, 
however, not to interpret this detection advantage as pertaining to the 
mean difference of individual participants’ concentration levels 
between the neutral and emotion condition. Instead, it pertains to a 
translation of the difference between the condition means of 
participants’ thresholds in terms of mean dilution steps into the 
physical concentrations reflected by these means. However, as we 
mentioned in our article, the object that triggers disgust has the same 
identity from the target to be detected. That is, it is logically incoherent 
to say that gas leaks trigger fear, which in turn triggers detection of gas 
leaks. Hence, it is prudent to qualify that there must first be another 
trigger of fear (not the gas leak), in order for an individual to have an 
olfactory detection advantage towards the gas leak. 
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Figure 5. A hypothetical plot to illustrate how threshold detection advantage at 
fearful (F) or neutral (N) states can be translated to detection time advantage, 
assuming that the concentration of methanethiol increases at 1 cubic units per 
second.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
Disgust Lowers Olfactory Threshold,  
But Does Scent Valence Matter?*  
 
Abstract 
 The olfactory system provides us with rich information about 
the world, but the odors around us are not always detectable. Previous 
research (Chan, Holland, van Loon, Aarts, & van Knippenberg, in-press) 
has shown that disgust enhances olfactory sensitivity to n-butanol, 
which incidentally is mildly negative. Thus it is unclear whether disgust, 
being a negative emotion, enhances sensitivity to stimuli with negative 
qualities, or across stimuli in general. Here we tested these competing 
hypotheses by examining thresholds to two scents, one positive 
(phenylethanol) and one negative (n-butanol), during a disgust, 
happiness, and neutral emotion induction. Our results indicated no 
valence-fit effect: Disgust, compared to the other two emotions, lowered 
olfactory thresholds to both n-butanol and phenylethanol equally. This 
suggests that disgust facilitates the detection of smells in general. Our 
results suggest that disgust facilitates the perceptual detection of 
extremely faint targets presumably because avoidant emotions enhance 
perceptual vigilance in general. 
                                                             
* This chapter is based on: Chan, K. Q., van Dooren, R., Holland, R. W., & van 
Knippenberg, A. (under review). Disgust lowers olfactory threshold, but does 
scent valence matter? 
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Emotions are not only functional at the behavioral level, but also 
at a perceptual level; they provide more information about the situation, 
such as whether the situation is benign or dangerous, so as to allow us 
to orchestrate our responses to environmental challenges adaptively 
(see Levenson, 1999). Indeed, in recent years, there has been some 
research demonstrating that emotions such as disgust and/or fear 
adaptively increases visual contrast sensitivity, and spatial and 
temporal resolution (e.g., Anderson, 2005; Bocanegra, & Zeelenberg, 
2011a; 2011b; Phelps, Ling, & Carrasco, 2006; Sherman, Haidt, & Clore, 
2012). These perceptual enhancements are presumably functional — a 
better visual contrast sensitivity would enable an organism to better 
discriminate what is clean versus contaminated; a better spatial 
resolution would enable an organism to see fine objects from a distance; 
a better temporal resolution would enable an organism to detect 
objects quicker. 
Much of this research on the adaptive functions of emotions in 
perception have focused only on vision (e.g., Anderson, 2005; 
Bocanegra, & Zeelenberg, 2011a; 2011b; Phelps, et al., 2006; Sherman 
et al., 2012). Recently, researchers (Chan, Holland, van Loon, Aarts, & 
van Knippenberg, in-press) have also found perceptual enhancements 
in olfaction. In that research, participants saw disgust- or fear-inducing 
pictures while olfactory thresholds to n-butanol were obtained. During 
the threshold measurements, participants were presented with odorant 
sticks containing n-butanol of different concentrations simultaneously 
with neutral blank sticks (Hummel, Sekinger, Wolf, Pauli, & Kobal, 
1997). The participants’ task was to discriminate which stick contained 
the target scent. The reliable stick concentration when this 
discrimination was consistent was taken as the individual’s olfactory 
 75 
 
threshold. The researchers consistently found that disgust and fear both 
lowered olfactory thresholds to n-butanol, implying that when 
experiencing these emotional states, individuals can detect a scent that 
they normally would not be able to detect. Although the effect was 
repeatedly obtained across three studies, the underlying mechanism 
remains unclear.  
There are two possible interpretations for the finding of Chan et 
al. (in-press). According to the authors (Chan et al., in-press), odors 
contain information about a particular object (e.g., food spoilage) or 
environment (e.g., smoke) but these odors are not always obvious. It is 
important to detect them because these odors may signal danger. 
However these odors may manifest in extremely low concentrations, 
making detection very difficult. Because disgust and fear are both 
avoidant emotions, the authors surmised that these emotions lowered 
olfactory thresholds due to vigilance evoked by avoidant emotions to 
faint odors in general. We call this the general vigilance hypothesis.  
However, there is an alternative explanation for their findings. 
This other interpretation is based on Chan et al.’s (in-press) use of n-
butanol in assessing olfactory thresholds. Although n-butanol is known 
in the literature to be a neutral odor, in our pretests, when asked to rate 
the valence of the smells, participants generally found it somewhat 
negative (see appendix for more information about these tests). 
Because both the independent variable (disgust and fear) and 
dependent variable (scent) were negative, individuals might have a 
lowered olfactory threshold because the valence of the emotion 
matched the valence of the scent. We call this the valence-fit hypothesis.  
Some research has indicated that perceptual performance is 
improved when the valence of one’s psychological state matches that of 
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the stimuli (Niedenthal & Setterlund 1994). For example, when negative 
or neutral words were flashed very quickly on screen (i.e., at threshold 
durations), sad participants compared to controls recognized more 
negative words than positive words (Powell & Hemsley, 1984; Small, 
1985). However, other research has suggested that emotions can 
improve perceptual performance even when neutral stimuli were used. 
For example, fear lowered visual contrast sensitivity to gabor patches 
(Phelps et al., 2006), grey squares/numbers (Sherman et al., 2012), and 
improved spatial resolution to Landolt circles (Bocanegra, & Zeelenberg, 
2011a; 2011b). These stimuli are all neutral. Therefore, both the 
general vigilance hypothesis and valence-fit hypothesis could hold. On 
the basis of Chan et al’s (in-press) data and other findings (Bocanegra, & 
Zeelenberg, 2011a; 2011b; Phelps et al., 2006; Powell & Hemsley, 1984; 
Sherman et al., 2012; Small, 1985), it is unclear which account 
constitutes the most plausible explanation for Chan et al.’s (in-press) 
findings. 
In the present research, we sought to tease apart which 
explanation was more likely. That is, how general is the disgust-
threshold effect—does disgust improve general olfactory sensitivity or 
only to odors that have specific valence qualities? We addressed this 
question by using one positive scent, phenylethanol (“rose scent”), and 
one negative scent, n-butanol (same scent as used before by Chan et al. 
[in press]). We employed three emotion induction conditions: disgust, 
neutral, and happiness by exposing participants to emotion-inducing 
pictures. A happiness condition was included because it allowed a 
second, and stronger test of the valence-fit hypothesis. That is, if the 
valence-fit hypothesis holds, then n-butanol (negative) thresholds 
would be lowered only in the disgust condition and phenylethanol 
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(positive) threshold would be lowered only in the happiness condition. 
However, if the general vigilance hypothesis holds, olfactory thresholds 
would be lower in the disgust condition compared to the neutral and 
happiness conditions, irrespective of the odor’s valence. Also, the 
general vigilance hypothesis would not predict any effect of the 
happiness induction on olfactory thresholds. Finally, because Chan et al. 
(in-press) found that n-butanol thresholds in the disgust condition 
decreased as disgust sensitivity increased, we also included a measure 
of disgust sensitivity (van Overveld, de Jong, Peters, & Schouten, 2011; 
see also Tybur, Lieberman, & Griskevicius, 2009).   
 
Study 3.1 
 
Method 
Participants and Design 
Sixty participants (48 females) were recruited from Radboud 
University. Their mean age was 21.4 (SD = 2.2). We used a 3 (Emotion: 
disgust [D], neutral [N], and happiness [H]) × 2 (Scent type: n-butanol, 
phenylethanol) fully within-participants design. Participants were 
randomly assigned to one of the six emotion counterbalanced orders 
(DNH, DHN, NDH, NHD, HDN, HND); within each emotion order, half of 
the participants would be tested with n-butanol first, and the other half 
with phenylethanol first.  
 
Procedure 
As in Chan et al. (in-press), the experiment was introduced as 
one testing the effect of smells on memory, and olfactory threshold was 
assessed intermittently within the emotion manipulation. Olfactory 
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thresholds were assessed using Sniffin’ Sticks, an established test kit for 
research and clinical diagnosis (Hummel et al., 1997). This test consists 
of a series of 16 triplets of tubes. Each triplet includes one tube 
containing a target odorant (n-butanol or phenylethanol) in progressive 
dilution steps by a factor of 2, starting from a concentration of 0.04 
(Stick #1) to 1.2 × 10-6 (Stick #16) n-butanol or phenylethanol. At the 
start of each block, participants were familiarized with the scent (Stick 
#2) that they would be detecting for that particular block. On each trial, 
two pictures were shown for 5 seconds each, followed by two rounds of 
olfactory threshold assessment. Each round involved participants 
smelling a triplet of odor sticks from the Sniffin’ Sticks battery. During 
each round, the experimenter randomly presented three sticks in 
succession from the same triplet. Of the three sticks, one contained the 
target odorant (target stick) and the other two sticks were blanks. 
Participants’ task was to indicate which stick smelled different from the 
other two.  
If the response was incorrect, the next triplet containing a target 
stick of a higher odorant concentration (i.e., one step higher) would be 
presented. On subsequent triplets, the target stick’s odorant 
concentration increased by one step at a time. Eventually a correct 
identification would occur. When that happened, the next triplet 
containing a target stick of lower concentration was presented (i.e., a 
reversal of the staircase). Subsequent correct responses would further 
lower the target stimulus concentration, while incorrect responses 
would increase the concentration (a new reversal). This procedure was 
repeated and ended only when seven reversal points were obtained. 
This constituted one experimental block. The threshold dependent 
variable was computed as the mean of the last four staircase reversal 
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points (Hummel et al., 1997), where 1 represents the lowest sensitivity 
(highest threshold) and 16 is the highest sensitivity (lowest threshold). 
When a block ended, this was followed by two tasks: (i) a 
memory test, which helped bolster the cover story; and (ii) a filler task. 
In the memory test, a collage of 25 pictures was presented and 
participants had to indicate which pictures had not been presented 
earlier. For the filler task, we used the same one as Chan et al. (in-press) 
where participants had to identify, as quickly as possible, faint numbers 
(RGB = 255, 255, 255) that progressively darkened at -1 RGB/s. The 
data of this filler task was not analyzed. 
At the end of the sixth block, participants completed a 
manipulation check procedure: they sniffed a blank stick, Stick #2 (high 
concentration) of phenylethanol and n-butanol, all separately and in a 
randomized order; they then completed valence ratings of these odors 
from (1) Not at all pleasant to (7) Highly pleasant. Finally, participants 
completed demographic measures and the Dutch version of the Disgust 
Sensitivity Questionnaire (van Overveld et al, 2011), which measures 
the tendency to experience disgust in daily life. Participants were finally 
thanked and debriefed. 
 
Results 
Manipulation checks for scent valence 
Manipulation checks revealed that the valence rating for the 
neutral blank (M = 4.05, SD = 0.85) did not differ from the midpoint (i.e., 
4.0) of the scale, t(59) = .42, p = .67. Compared to the neutral blank, 
phenylethanol smelled more positive (M = 4.72, SD = 1.77), F(1, 59) = 
12.7, p = .001, ηp2 = .17, whereas n-butanol smelled more negative (M = 
3.38, SD = 1.56), F(1, 59) = 7.49, p = .008, ηp2 = .11; hence the difference 
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in valence between phenylethanol and n-butanol was expectedly strong, 
F(1, 59) = 15.9, p < .001, ηp2 = .21.  
Because the scent valence manipulation check was conducted at 
the end of the sixth threshold block, we also included other 
independent variables (i.e., Scent order and Emotion order) in our 
analyses on valence. The main effects of Scent order, F(1, 48) = 
0.10, p = .75, and Emotion order, F(5, 48) = 0.60, p = .70, on scent 
valence were also nonsignificant. For the higher order interactions, we 
found no significant Scent type × Scent order × Emotion order 
interaction, or Scent type × Emotion order interaction, Fs(10, 94) < 
1.24, ps >.27, on scent valence. We did, however, find an unanticipated 
Scent type × Scent order interaction, F(2, 47) = 10.51, p < .001; when 
thresholds for n-butanol were assessed first, the mean valence ratings 
for n-butanol (M = 2.67, SD = 1.42) were lower as compared to the 
neutral blank (M = 4.23, SD = 0.56) and phenylethanol (M = 5.33, SD = 
1.18), ts(29) > 5.63, p < .001. However, when thresholds for 
phenylethanol were assessed first, the mean valence ratings for n-
butanol (M = 4.10, SD = 1.81), neutral blank (M = 3.83, SD = 0.59), and 
phenylethanol (M = 4.10, SD = 1.68) did not differ significantly, ts(29) < 
0.87, ps > .39.   
 To establish that the valence of the scents were indeed different, 
an independent sample of 41 individuals rated the valence of n-butanol, 
phenylethanol, and the neutral blank in a counterbalanced order, 
without any emotion manipulation prior to rating the valence. This time, 
no Scent type × Scent order effects were found, F(10, 66) = 1.51, p = .16. 
However, we still found that the valence of n-butanol (M = 2.46, SD = 
1.09) was significantly lower than the valence of the neutral scent (M = 
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3.36, SD = .99), t(39) = 7.39, p < .001, which was in turn lower than the 
valence of phenylethanol (M = 4.56, SD = 1.31),  t(39) = 2.81, p < .001. 
 
Main analyses 
We first performed a 3 (Emotion: Disgust, neutral, and 
happiness) ×2 (Scent type: n-butanol vs. phenylethanol) × Disgust 
sensitivity (continuous factor: linear covariate) × 6 (Emotion order) × 2 
(Scent order: n-butanol first vs. phenylethanol first) mixed analysis of 
covariance (ANCOVA) with Emotion and Scent type as within-
participant factors and Disgust sensitivity as covariate. The sphericity 
assumption was not violated, Mauchly’s W = .92, 2(2) = 3.61, p = .16. 
Neither Emotion order nor Scent order produced any main or 
interacting effects, all Fs < 1.80, ps > .12, ηp2 < .12. Hence, subsequent 
analyses were collapsed across Emotion orders and Scent orders.  
A 3 (Emotion) × 2 (Scent type) × Disgust sensitivity (continuous 
factor: linear covariate) mixed ANCOVA with dilution steps as the 
dependent measure revealed a violation of the sphericity assumption, 
Mauchly’s W = .89, 2(2) = 6.90, p = .03. From Figure 1, it is evident the 
variances in thresholds were systematically larger in phenylethanol 
than in n-butanol. Hence we report Greenhouse-Geisser corrections for 
the degrees of freedom when comparing means between scents. There 
was no main effect of disgust sensitivity, F(1, 58) = .61, p = .44, ηp2 = .10, 
no three-way interaction, F(1.80, 104.13) = .35, p = .68, ηp2 = .006, and 
no two-way interactions with Scent type, F(1.80, 104.13) = .41, p = .53, 
ηp2 = .007, or with Emotion, F(1.90, 104.13) = 1.43, p = .24, ηp2 = .02.  
The crucial test of the valence-fit hypothesis is the Emotion × 
Scent type interaction. This interaction was nonsignificant, F(1.79, 
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105.82) = .85, p = .42, ηp2 = .01 (see Figure 1). Because the valence 
manipulation check did not uphold in all scent order conditions, the 
valence-fit hypothesis was tested within each scent order condition. In 
none of the scent order conditions was the Emotion × Scent type 
interaction significant, Fs(2, 28) < .34, ps > .67, ηp2 < .03.  
The critical test for the general vigilance hypothesis is the main 
effect of emotion, which was indeed significant, F(1.88, 105.82) = 24.9, p 
< .001, ηp2 = .30. Follow-up analyses revealed that disgust lowered 
thresholds compared to the Neutral, F(1, 59) = 41.83, p < .001, ηp2 = .42, 
and the Happiness condition, F(1, 59) = 23.4, p < .001, ηp2 = .28; 
thresholds in the Neutral and Happiness conditions did not differ from 
each other, F(1, 59) = 3.09, p = .08, ηp2 = .05. There was also a main 
effect of Scent type, F(1, 59) = 43.9, p < .001, ηp2 = .42, but this is 
theoretically uninteresting because thresholds of any two odorants are 
unlikely to be the same (see Devos, Patte, Rouault, Lafort, & van Gemert, 
1990). When we repeated the analyses for each scent order, our 
analyses revealed that the main effects were significant in both scent 
orders, Fs(2, 28) < 4.55, ps < .02, ηp2 > .25, and the comparisons 
between emotion conditions were likewise the same: disgust lowered 
thresholds compared to the Neutral, Fs(1, 29) > 9.42, ps < .005, ηp2 = .25, 
and the Happiness condition, Fs (1, 29) = 4.11, ps < .05, ηp2 = .12; 
thresholds in the Neutral and Happiness conditions did not differ from 
each other, Fs(1, 29) = 1.41, ps > .20, ηp2 < .05. Taken together, despite 
the unsuccessful manipulation check in one of the scent order 
conditions, the valence-fit hypothesis is rejected in both scent orders 
and the general vigilance hypothesis is confirmed in both these 
conditions.   
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Figure 1. Plot of Emotion and Scent Type on thresholds. A higher dilution step 
means a lower threshold. Error bars depict standard errors.  
 
Replicating previous results in Chan et al. (in-press) 
In the above analyses, we replicated the main findings of Chan et 
al. (in-press): Within n- butanol, there was a strong effect of disgust 
compared to neutral pictures. However, in Chan et al. (in-press), there 
was also a significant interaction between Emotion and Disgust 
sensitivity. Specifically, their simple effects indicated that n-butanol 
thresholds decreased as disgust sensitivity increased in their Disgust 
condition, but not in their Neutral condition. We tested whether we 
could replicate these findings. 
We ran a 3 (Emotion) × Disgust sensitivity (continuous) mixed-
participants ANCOVA within the n-butanol conditions.11 We found that 
disgust sensitivity did not produce any significant interactions, or main 
                                                             
11 The same results were obtained even when the Happiness condition was excluded 
(i.e., a strict replication of Chan et al. [in-press]). 
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effects, Fs(2, 116) = 1.40, ps > .25, η2 = .02. Figure 2 displays the plot for 
the n-butanol scent in order to directly compare this study with that of 
Chan et al. (in-press). Although this Disgust sensitivity × Emotion 
interaction was nonsignificant, the pattern of results was similar to 
Chan et al. (in-press). Subsequent simple effects analyses revealed that, 
disgust sensitivity correlated significantly with n-butanol threshold in 
the disgust condition, r = .26, p = .04; correlations of disgust sensitivity 
with thresholds in the neutral and happy conditions were 
nonsignificant, -.01 < rs < .11, ps > .28. (Correlations of disgust 
sensitivity with phenylethanol thresholds in all three emotion 
conditions were also nonsignificant, -.02 < rs < .03, ps >.80.) In short, we 
did not replicate the Emotion interaction × Disgust sensitivity in Chan et 
al. (in-press), but we did replicate the simple effects of Disgust 
sensitivity within the Disgust condition. 
 
Discussion 
In summary, we found that disgust decreased thresholds to both 
n-butanol (a negative scent) and phenylethanol (a positive scent). We 
also found that happiness did not lower threshold to phenylethanol. 
These results suggest that disgust facilitates the perceptual detection of 
extremely faint olfactory targets not because the negativity of disgust is 
compatible with the negativity of the olfactory target (i.e., the valence-
fit hypothesis), but because disgust triggers a general perceptual 
vigilance towards environmental olfactory cues (i.e., the general 
vigilance hypothesis). This conclusion is important because it clarifies 
the underlying mechanism behind how disgust enhances olfactory 
sensitivity.  
 
 85 
 
 
Figure 2. Effects of disgust sensitivity and emotion conditions on n-butanol 
thresholds. Higher dilution steps scores imply lower thresholds. The pattern of 
results is similar to Chan et al.’s (in-press) Studies 2 and 3. Note that Chan et al. 
(in-press), n-butanol, not phenylethanol, was used to measure thresholds. 
Error bars represent standard errors. 
 
The rigor of our experimental design allowed us to confidently 
reject the valence-fit hypothesis in favor of the general vigilance 
hypothesis. In principle, comparing thresholds between n-butanol and a 
neutral valence scent vis-à-vis the disgust manipulation would have 
been sufficient. This is because neutral stimuli have traditionally been 
used to examine the effect of negative emotions (fear and disgust) on 
perceptual performance (Bocanegra, & Zeelenberg, 2011a; 2011b; 
Phelps, Ling, & Carrasco, 2006; Sherman, Haidt, & Clore, 2012). 
However, we compared thresholds of a positive and negative scent 
across positive, negative, and neutral emotions. Thus, this design 
constituted a stringent test of the valence-fit hypothesis, and the use of 
multiple scents also allowed us to test the general vigilance hypothesis 
simultaneously. 
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The manipulation check seemed not successful. This may be 
largely due to the limited diagnosticity of scent valence manipulation 
checks when manipulation checks are obtained after threshold 
measurements of about 10-15 minutes conclude. When individuals 
were asked to rate the valence of one or more target scents after one or 
several blocks of threshold measurements, it was unclear how 
carryover effects and prolonged sniffing changed individuals’ 
evaluation of the scent. When we conducted the extra pilot test to 
ascertain the valence of n-butanol and phenylethanol, no order effects 
were found. This suggests that the original order effects in the scent 
valence evaluation could be spurious. In any case, the threshold effects 
were found within each scent order. Hence the order effect in scent 
valence ratings does not threaten our conclusions about the general 
vigilance hypothesis.  
We did not fully replicate previous findings concerning the 
moderating role of disgust sensitivity on the relation between emotion 
and olfactory threshold.  Although our pattern of results was similar, 
and simple correlations within the disgust conditions were obtained, 
the Emotion × Disgust sensitivity interaction of Chan et al. (in-press) 
was not significant. It is possible that there was not enough power to 
replicate the interaction.12  Nevertheless, the main effect of emotions on 
                                                             
12 We discovered that participants in our research sample (M = 3.23; SD = .58) had 
higher scores on disgust sensitivity than participants in Study 2 (M = 2.92; SD = .28) 
and Study 3 (M = 3.00; SD = .58) of Chan et al (in-press). A post-hoc contrast 
analysis with contrast weights of +2, -1, -1 respectively revealed that the mean 
disgust sensitivity of the current experiment is significantly higher than in their 
experiments, F(2, 136) = 3.53, p = .03. This suggests that in the current experiment, 
there might not have been enough participants who are at the lower end of the 
disgust sensitivity spectrum in order to replicate Chan et al’s (in-press) Emotion × 
Disgust sensitivity interaction. 
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thresholds makes sense and is fully consistent with previous findings 
and reasoning (Chan et al., in-press).  
One question remains: How general is the general vigilance 
hypothesis? There are two ways to examine this question: within 
modality and between modalities. Within the olfactory modality, 
“general vigilance” may imply that disgust should enhance olfactory 
sensitivity to all scents. In this research, we have tested two (n-butanol 
and phenylethanol) out of 1 trillion scents that humans can 
discriminate (Bushdid, Magnasco, Vosshall, & Keller, 2014) and our aim 
was not to show how general the effect of disgust on different scent 
thresholds is. We carefully chose two scents that differ in valence 
because this allowed us to examine which of two competing hypothesis 
was a better explanation for previous research (Chan et al., in-press). By 
ruling out the valence-fit hypothesis in favor of the general vigilance 
hypothesis, we have already advanced our understanding about the 
underlying mechanisms leading disgust to enhance olfactory sensitivity. 
However it remains an open question to what extent our findings 
generalize across all scents because there are more scents than we can 
reasonably test.   
The question is more feasible to answer between modalities. 
Here, “general vigilance” may imply that disgust should enhance 
sensitivity across all perceptual modalities. Previous research revealed 
that disgust lowered threshold in visual perception (e.g., Sherman et al., 
2012), and we extended this work to the olfactory threshold (see also 
Chan et al., [in-press]).  It is interesting to test whether disgust might 
also lower thresholds in other domains across other sensory modalities.  
However, one must note that a functional perspective of emotions must 
work in tandem with a functional perspective of a particular perceptual 
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modality. Because a major function of disgust is to help the organism 
avoid pathogens (Oaten, Stevenson, & Case, 2009; Tybur, Lieberman, 
Kurzban, & DeScioli, 2013), it is useful for an organism in a disgust state 
to be able to detect subtle traces of pathogens. Pathogenic objects (e.g., 
rotten food) often have distinctive visual appearance (discolored), smell 
(rancid), taste (sour), and tactile feel (gooey), and that signal possible 
spoilage, but it is unlikely that pathogenic objects have distinctive 
sounds. Hence there may be strong evolutionary associations between 
disgust and vision, olfaction, gustation, and somatosensation, but not 
between disgust and audition. As such, disgust may also lower 
gustatory and haptic thresholds but not auditory thresholds.  
To conclude, the current research bolsters the idea that avoidant 
emotions lower olfactory thresholds, for positive and negative smells. 
Further research is needed to determine how general is the effect of 
avoidant emotions on perceptual vigilance, both within and between 
modalities. However it may be too simplistic to assume that avoidant 
emotions such as disgust and fear lower thresholds to all sensory 
modalities without considering why it would be adaptive for that 
particular sensory modality to have a lowered threshold.   
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Appendix 
 
Although n-butanol is typically regarded as a “neutral” odor 
(Hummel et al., 1997), its neutrality probably refers to its lack of 
consistent cognitive associations to any objects found in the 
environment. Humans are generally quite poor at describing odors 
(Majid & Burenhult, 2014). When asked to describe odors, people 
generally say that an odor “smells like [something else]”. In a separate 
pretest, we asked 80 participants to sniff and then describe 
phenylethanol (free association; see Chan, Tong, Tan, & Koh, 2013, for 
similar methodology). Content analyses indicated that it smelled like 
roses or perfume, both of which fall under the modal category flowers 
(or floral scent); when we asked another sample of 39 participants to 
freely associate what n-butanol smells like, 22% indicated that it 
smelled like marker pens, 19% said it smelled like something 
“chemical”. But unlike phenylethanol, there was no distinct dominant 
response (see Figure 3). Thus, n-butanol is neutral in the cognitive 
sense, but not in the evaluative sense, as suggested in the main text. 
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A: Phenylethanol 
 
B: n-butanol 
 
Figure 3. Qualitative responses when asked to describe phenylethanol 
(A) or n-butanol (B). It is evident that there are consistent cognitive 
associations of phenylethanol whereas this is absent in n-butanol. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
Vigilance in hearing: Avoidance motivation 
orientation lowers auditory thresholds* 
 
 
Abstract 
When individuals adopt an avoidant orientation (by any cause, 
e.g., explicit instructions, bodily feedback, threatening pictures), they 
become more vigilant, and enhanced vigilance arguably benefits from 
more acute processing of sensory information. In the current study we 
focus on the idea that avoidance-induced vigilance may enhance 
auditory performance in order to be better able to cope with potential 
threats. In Studies 4.1 and 4.2, we found that individuals performing an 
avoidance arm posture (vs. approach arm posture) had lower 
thresholds to high frequency (4000 Hz) tones than individuals 
performing an approach arm posture, but not to low frequency tones 
(1000 Hz). We postulated that this could be because high auditory 
frequencies tend to be judged more negatively, which we showed to be 
true using natural sounds (Study 4.3A) and pure tones (Study 4.3B). 
Novelty of high frequency tones could be an alternative explanation. 
However, by manipulating novelty of tones, Study 4.4 showed that the 
rarity of high frequency tones unlikely accounts for why avoidant 
                                                             
* This chapter is based on: Chan, K. Q., Holland, R., Hengstler, M., & van 
Knippenberg, A. (in-prep). Vigilance in hearing: Avoidance motivation 
orientation lowers auditory thresholds. 
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individuals had lower thresholds to high frequency tones. In contrast, 
by manipulating valence of 1000 Hz tones in Studies 4.5A and 4.5B, we 
showed that avoidant individuals have a lower threshold than approach 
individuals when tone valence is negative and not when positive, 
suggesting that tone valence is the mediator. A meta-analysis of our 
results suggests that the effect is relatively weak. Our research suggests 
that motivational orientation can engage consciousness at a very early 
stage in perceptual processing, even when signals are extremely weak.   
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Introduction 
Human beings have well-tuned hearing capabilities suited to the 
ecology in which we live. A “normal” person has an auditory threshold 
close to 0 dB, can hear sounds between 20 Hz to 20,000 Hz (Martin & 
Clark, 2012), and has the ability to localize an object in space based at a 
minimum auditory angle of merely 1˚ (Mills, 1958; Perrott & Saberi, 
1990). When assessing such auditory capabilities, researchers and 
clinicians typically discount or neglect the role of motivational states 
because what is typically of interest is the actual capabilities of the 
auditory system (e.g., threshold, discrimination, identification; Martin & 
Clark, 2012), or sensory characteristics of the stimuli (e.g., tone 
duration, timbre, frequency, etc.; see Hirsh & Watson, 1996). We 
suggest, however, that motivational states have an important influence 
on auditory sensitivity (see Zadra & Clore, 2011).  
Approach and avoidance orientations are fundamental building 
blocks of human motivation (Elliot, 2008). An approach motivational 
orientation helps individuals to obtain essential outcomes including 
food, drinks, and partners. On the other hand, an avoidance 
motivational orientation prevents individuals from danger and negative 
outcomes. Thus, compared to approach motivational orientation, 
avoidance motivational orientation evokes vigilance, attention to detail, 
systematic information processing, and the recruitment of cognitive 
resources (see Koch, Holland, & van Knippenberg, 2008; Koch, Holland, 
Hengstler, & van Knippenberg, 2009; Roskes, Elliot, Nijstad, & de Dreu, 
2013). This is adaptive because an avoidance state signals potential 
threats that may have to be dealt with. Extending the above studies, we 
examined the effects of motivational orientation at an even more basic 
level: perceptual thresholds in the auditory domain.  
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Perceptual thresholds represent a unique way to examine the 
adaptiveness of perceptual systems. An absolute threshold, in 
psychophysical terms, means the lowest amount of physical input that 
is needed to trigger a conscious experience of that input (Fechner, 
1860/1966; see also Corso, 1963). While threats are often discernible 
by sight, some also manifest subtly. A predator preparing to pounce on 
its prey would increase its success if it moves as stealthily as possible; 
yet, a prey wishing to live another day would increase its success if it 
can detect such a predator as early as possible. Acting quickly after 
encountering threats is adaptive, but being able to detect a threat 
earlier rather than later is even more adaptive because pre-emptive 
actions can be performed. One potential way for an avoidance state to 
benefit perceptual systems is for it to allow the organism to be sensitive 
enough to detect signals, because some of these signals may signal 
threat. Hence we predicted that an avoidance state, being associated 
with vigilance, would lower auditory thresholds, making auditory cues 
possibly signally threat more easily detectable. 
There has not been any direct evidence for the influence of 
motivational orientations on perceptual systems. However, there has 
been some research on how avoidant emotions tune perceptual systems. 
In emotion research, approach and avoidance concepts are central to 
many models of emotion (Elliot, Eder, & Harmon-Jones, 2013). For 
example, research has demonstrated that when individuals are exposed 
to fear-inducing stimuli (e.g., fear faces), they are better able to 
determine the left-right orientation of gabor patches (visual contrast 
sensitivity; Phelps, Ling, & Carrasco, 2006), detect whether a tiny gap 
exist in a C-shape stimulus (visual acuity; Bocanegra & Zeelenberg, 
2009), or notice a negative target stimuli that is embedded among a 
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sequence of flashed distracters (inattentional blindness; Anderson, 
2005). Recent research has also demonstrated that avoidance emotions 
such as disgust and fear lower olfactory (Chan, Holland, van Loon, Arts, 
& van Knippenberg, in-press), and visual thresholds (Sherman, Haidt, & 
Clore, 2012). These studies have focused only on vision and olfaction. 
Like any other sensory stimuli, sounds give us information about our 
immediate environment. However it is yet unknown if the effects found 
in vision and olfaction would generalize to audition. Furthermore, the 
involvement of both fear and disgust on these various perceptual tasks 
hints at the possibility that a more general avoidant motivational 
orientation may sharpen sensory capabilities. 
 
Overview of the present studies 
 In Studies 4.1 and 4.2, we conditionally established the vigilance 
effect in hearing by testing the hearing thresholds to tones of various 
frequencies when participants were in an approach or avoidance 
motivational orientation state. To foreshadow some of our results, we 
obtained lower thresholds for high frequency, but not for low frequency 
sounds. We then posited two reasons for the moderating role of tone 
frequency: an avoidance orientation could trigger vigilance for (i) novel, 
or (ii) negatively valenced sounds. In Studies 4.3A and 4.3B, we first 
verified what tones were rare and negative. Then in Studies 4.4 and 4.5, 
we investigated whether rarity or valence of the tones could account for 
the vigilance effect in hearing. We disclose two failed attempts in the 
Appendix. No other studies were conducted in this line of research by 
our lab. 
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Study 4.1  
 In Study 4.1, we investigated whether individuals in an 
avoidance state have a lower auditory threshold. We first induced an 
approach or avoidance motivational orientation in our participants. 
There are several ways one can manipulate approach/avoidance 
orientation, such as (1) having participants complete an “unrelated” 
first task where they have to find a reward (e.g., a cheese) or avoid 
capture (Friedman & Förster, 2001); (2) presenting approach related 
pictures (e.g. tasty foods, vacation pictures) or avoidance related 
pictures  (e.g. a bloody knife or disgusting food items); and (3) 
performing approach/avoidant body postures (e.g., Cacciopo, Priester, 
& Berntson, 1993). Our manipulation would need be “active” over the 5-
10 mins duration of the threshold measurement (thus ruling out Option 
1), and would not interfere with listening (thus ruling out Option 2). 
Hence we chose to induce approach/avoidant motivational orientation 
by having participants adopt arm flexion or extension postures while 
they performed the auditory threshold task (Option 3).  
Arm extension is usually coupled with the onset of an 
unconditioned aversive stimulus, whereas arm flexion is usually 
coupled with the acquisition of desirable stimuli (Cacioppo et al., 1993; 
Chen & Bargh, 1997). Over time, these arm movements become 
associated with positive and negative outcomes, respectively. Via bodily 
feedback, enacting an avoidant arm extension posture may thus signal 
the presence of a problematic environment whereas enacting an 
approach arm flexion posture may signal the presence of a safe 
environment or the absence of threat. Having participants adopt an arm 
flexion or extension posture has been successfully used in many 
research as an effective means to trigger an approach or avoidance 
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motivational orientation, respectively (e.g., Cacioppo et al., 1993; 
Priester, Cacioppo, & Petty, 1996; Friedman & Förster, 2002; Slepian, 
Young, Rule, Weisbuch, & Ambady, 2012; Koch et al., 2008; Hengstler, 
Holland, Steenbergen & van Knippenberg, 2014), and its effectiveness is 
supported in a recent meta-analysis (Laham, Kashima, Dix, & Wheeler, 
2014). 
During the approach/avoidance manipulation, we assessed 
participants’ auditory threshold toward two tones. Because tones 
between 250 Hz to 4000 Hz are recommended as stimuli for clinical 
assessment of hearing (American Speech-Language-Hearing Association, 
2004), for exploratory reasons we used 250 Hz and 4000 Hz as test 
stimuli. We expected individuals in an avoidant motivational 
orientation to have lower auditory threshold to both tones than 
individuals in an approach motivational orientation. 
 
Method 
Participants and Design 
Participants were 159 students (121 females) at Radboud 
University Nijmegen who participated for course credits or €5. Their 
average age was 22.12 (SD = 2.85). We used a 2 (Motivational 
orientation: approach vs. avoidance) × 2 (Tone frequency: 250 Hz vs. 
4000 Hz) between-participants design. 
 
Stimuli and Procedure 
 Participants were seated in a cubicle on chairs without 
armrests, with a computer monitor in front of them that presented all 
instructions. Half the participants were told to push a small foam ball up 
against the underside of their table (approach condition), whereas the 
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other half were told to push the ball down on the upper side of their 
table (avoidance condition; see Cacciopo et al., 1993; Koch, et al, 2008). 
Participants’ auditory thresholds towards 250 Hz and 4000 Hz sine-
wave tones, each with a tone duration of 100ms, and rise and fall times 
of 10 ms were assessed while they were in these approach or avoidance 
motivational orientation states.  
To assess auditory thresholds, we used a double interleaved 
staircase design (Ehrenstein & Ehrenstein, 1999). Interleaved staircase 
designs are widely used to measure perceptual thresholds because they 
have many advantages over other methods such as the constant-
stimulus method (Dai, 1995). In our design, there were two staircases: 
Staircase A and B. In each trial, participants heard a tone presented 
through their headphones. On trial 1 (Staircase A), participants heard a 
tone well above threshold intensity. On trial 2 (Staircase B), participants 
heard a tone well below threshold intensity. On trial 3, the next stimulus 
of Staircase A was presented (with a tone volume slightly lower than 
trial 1), and on trial 4, the next stimulus from Staircase B (with a tone 
volume slightly higher than trial 2), and so on. Participants’ task was to 
left-click on the mouse whenever they hear a tone. For Staircase A, the 
stimuli intensity decreases by a certain number of decibels until it 
becomes too weak to be detected. At this point, the series was reversed 
(called a reversal) and the stimulus intensity was increased for the next 
trial. Conversely for Staircase B, the stimulus intensity increased until it 
was strong enough to be detected. When that happened, the series was 
reversed and the stimulus intensity was decreased for the next trial.13 
                                                             
13 For the first two reversals, the tone volume was adjusted (increased or 
decreased, depending on whether it was the ascending trial or the descending 
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Over the course of the trials, the stimulus intensity flipped back and 
forth around the threshold value and eventually converged. In each 
staircase, there had to be seven reversals in order to arrive at the 
threshold intensity. The threshold was determined by the mean value of 
the last four reversals from each staircase (i.e., a total of eight reversals; 
see also Hummel et al., 1997).  
 
Results 
Two participants experienced computer problems and their 
data was not recorded. In addition, two outliers (> 3.5 SDs from the 
mean) were removed (the pattern of statistical significant and non-
significant findings were identical when these participants were 
included). We performed a 2 (motivational orientation: approach vs. 
avoidance) × 2 (tone frequency: 250 Hz vs. 4000 Hz) between-
participants ANOVA. Our analysis revealed that individuals have a lower 
threshold to 4000 Hz tones than 1000 Hz tones, F(1, 150) = 6.84, p = .01, 
ηp2 = .04. This main effect of frequency is a standard finding in 
audiometry (see e.g. Robinson & Dadson, 1956). As we expected, 
avoidance individuals had a lower threshold than approach individuals, 
F(1, 150) = 12.3, p < .001, ηp2 = .08. However, unexpectedly, these main 
effects were qualified by a significant interaction, F(1, 150) = 17.9, p 
< .001, ηp2 = .11. Simple effects analyses showed that participants in the 
avoidance condition (compared to those in the approach condition) had 
lower thresholds for the 4000 Hz tone, t(73) = 2.91, p = .005, d = 0.68, 
                                                                                                                                              
trial, respective) by 6 dB; for the third reversal, the stimulus was adjusted by 3 dB. 
For the last four reversals, the stimuli were adjusted by 1 dB to arrive at a precise 
threshold measurement (see Cornsweet, 1962; Soranzo & Grassi, 2014).  
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but not for the 250 Hz tone, t(81) = 0.35, p = .72, d = .08. See Figure 1A. 
No other significant effects were obtained. 
 
Discussion 
 We predicted that avoidant individuals would have a lower 
threshold across both tones, but instead found an effect only for the 
high frequency tone. We conducted Study 4.2 to further explore the 
nature of this interaction. 
 
Study 4.2 
In Study 4.2, we sought to replicate Study 4.1, and extended it by 
using 200 Hz, 500 Hz, and 1000 Hz tones, in addition to 4000 Hz tones 
used in Study 4.1. We chose the 200 Hz tone because this value 
captured the fundamental frequency of human speech (Puts, Gaulin, & 
Verdolini, 2006), which ranges from 80 Hz (males) to 240 Hz (females); 
we chose frequencies of 500 and 1000 Hz because these are standard 
frequencies used in audiometry (American Speech Language Hearing 
Association, 1978). 
 
Method 
Participants 
We recruited 161 participants (133 females). Their mean age 
was 21.70 (SD = 2.46). The design was a 2 (motivational orientation: 
approach vs. avoidance) × 4 (tone frequency: 200 vs. 500 vs. 1000 vs. 
4000 Hz) between-participants design. 
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Materials and Procedure 
We used 200 Hz, 500 Hz, and 1000 Hz tones, in addition to the 
4000 Hz tones used previously. The procedure was otherwise identical 
to Study 4.1. 
 
Results 
No outliers were found in this study. A 2 (motivational 
orientation: approach vs avoidance) × 4 (tone frequency: 200 Hz, 500 
Hz, 1000 Hz, 4000 Hz) ANOVA revealed no main effect of motivational 
orientation, F(1, 153) = .90, p = .34, η2 = .006, however, a significant 
main effect of frequency, F(3, 153) = 85.2, p < .001, η2 = .63, was found, 
just like in Study 4.1. More importantly, and in line with Study 4.1, we 
obtained a significant interaction, F(1, 153) = 3.47, p = .01, η2 = .06. 
Simple effects analyses showed that avoidant participants compared to 
approach participants had a lower threshold only in the 4000 Hz 
conditions, t(39) = 2.70, p = .01, d = .84, but not in the other three 
conditions, t(39) < 1.10, p > .28, d < .34. Thus we replicated the effect of 
motivational orientation on auditory threshold for 4000 Hz. See Figure 
1B.  
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A 
 
B 
 
Figure 1. Plot of tone frequency and motivational orientation against auditory 
threshold in Studies 4.1 (A) and 4.2 (B). Error bars represent standard errors. 
 
Discussion 
Study 4.2 showed again that within the 4000 Hz condition, 
individuals with an avoidance (vs. approach) motivational orientation 
had a lower threshold. We posit two possible reasons why an avoidance 
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motivational orientation could favour the detection of high frequency 
sounds. First, high frequency sounds are rare in the environment. If an 
avoidance motivational orientation promotes vigilance, then it should 
promote vigilance to signals that are uncommon (see Clark, 2013). In 
line with this proposition, researchers have found that, fear and anxiety, 
both avoidant states, increased attention to novel stimuli (e.g., Bradley, 
2009; Foote et al., 1983; Grillon, & Ameli, 1994; Svensson, 1987). In 
addition, other studies have shown that individuals who were high in 
state and trait anxiety (both related to avoidance orientation) had 
greater brain activity in response to novel stimuli (Hogan, Butterfield, 
Phillips, & Hadwin, 2007; Ousdal, Andreassen, Server, Jensen, 2014).  
Second, we suspected that high frequency sounds are more 
unpleasant, and that people in an avoidance motivational state 
compared to an approach motivational state may be more sensitive to 
merely negative sounds. High frequency sounds such as sirens, a baby’s 
cry, and screams, may signal possible threats in the environment 
(Goodman, 2009). Low frequency sounds, on the other hand, are often 
soothing and pleasing, such as meditation music, and in fact low 
frequency sounds have been proven to pacify irritable infants (Birns, 
Blank, Bridger, & Escalona, 1965). Past research has shown that 
perceptual performance was facilitated when the valence of the stimuli 
matched the affective nature of the motivational orientation 
(Niedenthal & Setterlund 1994). In one example, when participants had 
to pull or push to emotional words, they took less time to pull positive 
words towards them whereas they took less time to push negative 
words away from them (Chen & Bargh, 1999). If high frequencies are 
negative signals, then we should expect avoidance individuals to be 
more sensitive to high frequency sounds than approach individuals.  
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In Study 4.3, we first aimed to verify our assumptions about the 
rarity and valence of high frequency sounds. Then in Studies 4.4 and 4.5, 
by manipulating rarity and valence of sounds, we investigated whether 
rarity and valence could explain our findings in Studies 4.1 and 4.2.  
 
Study 4.3 
In Study 4.3A and 4.3B, we investigated whether high frequency 
tones were indeed rarer and also rated as more negative. In Study 4.3A, 
we analysed archival valence data in a sound database. In Study 4.3B, 
participants rated the valence of sounds of different frequencies. 
 
Study 4.3A 
 A single source of a natural sound such as human speech spans a 
wide range of frequencies. For example, human speech can have a 
fundamental frequency of 80 Hz (males), and subsequent formants to 
4000 Hz and above. However, what we most saliently experience as 
pitch is the fundamental frequency. In Study 4.3A, we extracted the 
fundamental frequency of emotionally evocative natural sounds from 
the International Affective Digitized Sounds (IADS; Bradley & Lang, 
2007). These clips were three seconds long, and had previously been 
rated on pleasantness, arousal, and dominance (Bradley & Lang, 2007). 
We correlated pleasantness ratings with the extracted fundamental 
frequencies. 
 
Method 
Materials and Procedure 
We extracted the fundamental frequency of each clip using Praat 
(Boersma & Weenink, 2014). Out of 167 clips, the fundamental 
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frequencies of 23 clips could not be identified by Praat and were thus 
excluded from the analysis. The names (stimuli number) of the excluded 
clips, as in the original Bradley & Lang (2007) dataset, were: Crowd2 
(311), Office1 (320), TypeWriter (322), Applause1 (351), Baseball (353), 
Writing (358), CourtSport (370), Paint (373), Sink (374), Rain1 (377), 
Jet (400), Helicopter1 (403), Helicopter2 (705), Phone2 (705), Clock 
(708), Walking (722), Paper1 (728), Paper2 (729), WomanCrying (280), 
Shovel (382), Rain2 (698), and Chewing (724). One clip, RattleSnake 
(134), technically has no fundamental frequency because it contains 
sounds in constant power spectral density from 2000 Hz to 4000 Hz. In 
this instance, we conservatively coded RattleSnake as 2000 Hz. We then 
correlated these frequencies with the published pleasantness rating, 
which had been previously rated on 1 (low pleasure) to 9 (high pleasure) 
using a self-assessment manikin in Bradley and Lang (2007). 
 
Results  
 High frequency sounds were indeed rated as more negative, 
r(143) = -.16, p = .05. Although homoscedasticity was not violated, 
Breusch-Pagan, 2(1) = .26, p = .72, the frequency variable was highly 
skewed, t = 11.97, p < .01 (see Figure 2A). Hence we also repeated the 
correlation test using a log-transformed fundamental frequency 
(Breusch-Pagan 2(1) = .25, p = .61; skewness t = 1.63, p = .11) and 
obtained identical results, r(143) = -.16, p = .05. Furthermore, from 
analyzing Figure 2A it becomes evident that high pitch sounds are rare 
in our natural environment. The fundamental frequencies of these 
natural sounds are typically less than 2000 Hz (median = 475 Hz).  
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Discussion 
Consistent with our intuitions, individuals found high frequency 
sounds to be more negative. This is consistent with previous research 
which used another set of natural sounds (Kumar, von Kriegstein, 
Friston, & Griffiths, 2012). In addition, from the sample of sound clips 
we used, we also found that high frequency sounds are rarer in the 
natural environment. Although this sample of natural sounds is limited 
and may not be representative of our natural auditory ecology, it is 
probably acceptable to assume that we rarely hear pitches above 2000 
Hz. The human voice can cover frequencies between 82 Hz and 1174 Hz, 
with the normal speaking of adult men averaging around 125 Hz and 
women averaging around 200 Hz (Titze, 1994); road traffic in cities is 
loudest at frequencies between 700 Hz and 1300 Hz (Sandberg, 2003); 
sirens typically range from 1000 to 3000 Hz; a 4000 Hz tone is 
approximately pitch of the highest C8 piano note (4186 Hz). Hence 
sounds at pitches around 4000 Hz are not common in everyday lives 
than the lower frequency sounds.   
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A 
 
B 
 
Figure 2. Plot of pleasantness ratings against frequency of tones (Hz) for raw 
(A) and log-transformed data (B). Each datapoint represents one sound clip. 
The trend lines represents the correlations between ratings and frequency. 
 
Study 4.3B 
Natural sounds allow us to test our intuitions in an ecologically 
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in Study 4.3A (e.g., screams) naturally have negative connotations, and 
they happened to be high frequency sounds. In Study 4.3B, we used 
content-free pure tones, which had two advantages: (a) It would allow 
us to test the pure effect of tone frequency on valence; (b) It would 
make our conclusions more relevant to Studies 4.1 and 4.2 where pure 
tone thresholds were assessed. 
  
Method 
Participants & Design 
Thirty-two participants (23 females) took part; their mean age 
was 23.00 (SD = 3.08). Tones of different frequencies were presented to 
each participant in a within-participants design. 
 
Materials and Procedure 
Tones of 100, 250, 500, 1000, 2000, 4000, 12000 Hz were used. 
All tones were 100ms long, had 10 ms rise and fall times, and were 70 
phons loud (Robinson & Dadson, 1956).  
On each trial, participants heard a randomly selected tone 
presented thrice, with each instance separated by 1000 ms. After each 
tone, participants were asked the three questions assessing positive 
valence (α = .83) (“How positive / pleasant / soothing do you find the 
tone?”), and three questions assessing negative valence (α = .56)14 
(“How negative/unpleasant/irritating did you find the tones?”). They 
rated their evaluations from 1 = Not at all to 5 = Very much.  
 
 
                                                             
14 The low reliability likely underestimates the relationship between negativity 
and frequency, but does not invalidate it (see Schmitt, 1996) 
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Results  
Compared to low-frequency tones, high frequency tones were 
less positively evaluated, linear F(1, 31) = 10.6, p = .003, η2 = .26, and 
simultaneously more negatively evaluated, linear F(1, 31) = 5.18, p = .03, 
η2 = .14. From Figure 3, there were evident quadratic trends within each 
valence evaluation. Compared to mid-frequency tones, low and high 
frequencies were less positively evaluated, quadratic effect, F(1, 31) = 
20.9, p < .001, η2 = .40, and simultaneously more negatively evaluated, 
quadratic effect, F(1, 31) = 10.6, p = .003, η2 = .26.  
 
Figure 3. Plot of tone frequency against positive and negative ratings. Error 
bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
 
Discussion 
Using content-free pure tones, Study 4.3B also found that high 
frequency tones were negatively evaluated. Taken together, Studies 
4.3A and 4.3B verified our intuitions that high frequency sounds are 
both rare and evaluated negatively. In the coming studies, we sought to 
investigate whether rarity (Study 4.4) and/or valence (Study 4.5) can 
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explain why avoidance orientation lowers auditory thresholds only for 
high frequency sounds. 
 
Study 4.4 
 Study 4.4 explored the rarity (or novelty) explanation. Past 
research has shown that the processing of novel stimuli is prioritized 
over familiar stimuli. For example, novel stimuli elicit more brain 
activation and the brain responds faster to novel auditory stimuli than 
to non-novel stimuli (Kiehl, Laurens, Duty, Forster & Liddle, 2001; 
Ranganath & Rainer, 2003).  This is adaptive because novel stimuli 
signal changes in the environment that may be worth attending to. In 
addition, fear increased attention to novel stimuli (Foote et al., 1983; 
Svensson, 1987). Hence, it is possible that under an avoidant 
orientation, individuals’ perceptual systems become more sensitive to 
detect stimuli that are novel—in this case, high frequency tones.  
To test the novelty explanation, we manipulated the novelty of 
the tones—half the participants were habituated to the testing tone, 
while the other half were habituated to a non-testing tone. Thereafter 
their thresholds were assessed while they adopted an approach or 
avoidance posture, as in Studies 4.1 and 4.2. 
 
Method 
Participants 
We recruited 119 participants (82 females) who participated for 
course credits or €7.50. Their mean age was 22.59 (SD = 3.20). The 
design was a 2 (Motivational orientation: Approach vs. Avoidance) × 2 
(Habituation: Novel vs. Habituated) between-participants design.  
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Materials and Procedure 
 To manipulate novelty, participants did a “spatial localization 
task”. In this task, there were 150 trials where a white circle was 
presented in a random location and participants had to click on it. At 
that instance, either a 4000 Hz or 500 Hz tone was presented. In the 
Habituated condition, participants heard only the 4000 Hz tones; in the 
Novel condition, participants heard only the 500 Hz tones. Participants 
then performed the auditory threshold task in an approach or 
avoidance arm posture for 4000 Hz tones, employing the same 
procedure as in Studies 4.1 and 4.2.  
 
Results 
No outliers were found in this study. A 2 (Motivational 
orientation: Approach vs Avoidance) × 2 (Habituation: Novel vs. 
Habituated) between-participants ANOVA revealed no interaction, 
F(1,115) = 2.83, p = .10, η2 = .02, and no main effects of Motivational 
orientation, F(1,115) = .37, p = .54, η2 = .003, or Habituation, F(1,115) 
= .74, p = .39, η2 = .006. This indicated that the novelty of a 4000 Hz tone 
is unlikely to explain the approach/avoidance effects in Studies 4.1 and 
4.2. In addition, planned contrasts revealed that within the novel 4000 
Hz tone condition, there was no significant threshold difference 
between the approach (M = 5.51; SD = 5.38) and avoidance (M = 8.31; 
SD = 6.85) conditions, t(58) = 1.62, p = .11. 
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Discussion 
The absence of an interaction between motivational orientation 
and habituation suggests that it is unlikely that the novelty towards 
4000 Hz tone could explain the approach/avoidance effects in Studies 
4.1 and 4.2. However, we also did not find that avoidance individuals 
(compared to approach individuals) had lower threshold towards 4000 
Hz tones in the non-habituation control condition (i.e., in the conditions 
that most closely resemble Studies 4.1 and 4.2). If anything, the trend 
was in the opposite direction. Therefore, this study did not reveal 
conclusive evidence for the role of novelty in our thresholds effects of 
motivational orientation. We decided to continue to study our second 
possible interpretation: the role of valence. 
 
Study 4.5 
The purpose of Study 4.5 was to examine whether the negative 
valence of the 4000 Hz tone can explain why avoidant individuals have 
lower auditory thresholds only for higher frequency tones in Studies 4.1 
and 4.2. Although we have established that 4000 Hz tones are negative 
in valence (Studies 4.3A and 4.3B), it is unclear whether negativity per 
se is the reason for the lowered thresholds among avoidance 
individuals. A direct manipulation of negativity would provide stronger 
evidence. In Studies 4.5A and 4.5B, we manipulated the valence of a 
tone via a conditioning procedure. We used a 1000 Hz tone in the 
conditioning procedure for two reasons: First, because the valence of 
the 1000 Hz tone was neutral (see results of Study 4.3B), we reasoned 
that it would be easier for it to acquire either a positive or negative 
valence; second, we postulated that it would be very difficult to 
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condition a 4000 Hz to become positive (or even less negative) because 
the valence of 4000 Hz tones is already extremely negative (Study 4.3B). 
After the conditioning procedure, auditory threshold to the 
conditioned tones were assessed while participants were in an 
approach or avoidance state, employing the same arm movement 
manipulation as in our previous studies. We reasoned that if avoidance 
individuals had a lower threshold to high frequency sounds because the 
latter sounds are more negative compared to low frequency sounds, 
then avoidant individuals should have a lower threshold to negative 
valence tones than positive valence tones.  
 
Study 4.5A 
Method 
Participants 
We recruited 138 students (109 females) who participated in 
exchange for course credits or €5. Their mean age was 23.52 (SD = 
6.80). 
 
 
Procedure 
As a pre-measure, we first assessed participants’ evaluation 
towards 500, 1000, 4000 Hz tones (all calibrated to 70 phons) by asking 
them how positive (beautiful, positive, and nice; α = .86) and how negative 
(negative, irritating, and threatening; α = .80) they find the tones, on a scale 
of 1 = Not at all to 7 = Very much. Then, to manipulate valence, we paired 
the 1000 Hz tone with valenced pictures from the International Affective 
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Picture System (IAPS; Lang, Bradley, Cuthbert, 1997).15 The negative 
pictures were selected to induce fear (e.g., threatening animals, gunpoint, 
etc.) and the positive pictures (e.g., appetizing food, romantic couples, etc.) 
were selected to match the negative pictures on arousal. A trial started 
with a fixation cross. After 500 ms, the tone was presented. In the Positive 
conditioning group, 200 ms after the tone a positive picture appeared for 
950 seconds. After a delay of 1450 ms a negative picture appeared for 
1650 ms. The procedure was reversed in the Negative conditioning group, 
such that the tone was immediately followed by a negative picture for 950 
ms and, after a delay, a positive picture appeared for 1650 ms (see Figure 
5). This setup ensured that each experimental condition was equally 
exposed to both positive and negative pictures, and that the only difference 
between groups was what the tone was paired with. There were 30 trials 
in total.  
As manipulation check, when the conditioning phase ended 
participants again had to evaluate the same set of tones again employing 
the same scales. Finally, the auditory thresholds of the conditioned 1000 
Hz tones were assessed while they were either in an approach or 
avoidance motivational state, as in Studies 4.1 and 4.2. 
  
 
                                                             
15 The positive pictures were: 1999, 2000, 2040, 2050, 4599, 4601, 4603, 7200, 
7351, 7352, 7360, 7380, 7390, 7430, 8380. The negative pictures were: 1120, 
1300, 2690, 2691, 2800, 2900, 3015, 3220, 6190, 6250, 6300, 6510, 6940, 
9253, and 9410. 
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Figure 5. The illustration depicts the negative conditioning procedure. For the 
positive conditioning procedure, the positive picture would appear first (at 950 
ms), followed by the negative picture (at 1650 ms). Note: The actual images 
used were from the IAPS, which is copyrighted and hence not reproduced here. 
 
Results 
No outliers were found in this study. We first assessed whether 
our manipulation of tone valence was successful by comparing pre- and 
post-ratings using paired samples t-tests. Comparing pre- and post-
ratings, when paired with negative stimuli, the 1000 Hz tone was rated 
as more negative, t(67) = 2.22, p = .03, and less positive, t(67) = 2.18, p 
= .03. Likewise comparing pre- and post-ratings, when paired with 
positive stimuli, the 1000 Hz tone was not less negative, t(69) = 1.32, p 
= .19, or more positive, t(69) = 1.62, p = .10. There were no changes in 
valence for the unconditioned 250 Hz and 4000 Hz tones (ps > .11). 
Hence the conditioning procedure was successful in changing the tone 
valence from neutral to negative, but not from neutral to positive.  
A 2 (motivational orientation: approach vs. avoidance) × 2 (tone 
valence: positive vs. negative) revealed no significant interaction, F(1, 
137) = .002, p = .96, ηp 2 < .001. There was no main effect of Motivational 
orientation, F(1, 137) = .94, p = .34, ηp 2 = .007. However, there was a 
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significant main effect of Tone valence, F(1, 137) = 3.92, p = .05, ηp2 = .03, 
which showed that participants had a lower threshold to negatively 
conditioned 1000Hz tones. None of the four simple effects were 
significant (ts < 1.42, ps > .16). See Figure 6.  
 
Discussion 
Although there was no interaction between motivational 
orientation and valence of tone, this could be because the manipulation 
of tone valence was relatively weak. At the same time, the overall 
pattern of means was consistent with our predictions. Hence, for the 
next study, we improved on our design.  
In addition, it is worth noting that participants had a lower 
threshold to negatively conditioned tones in general. Previously 
Stefanucci and Siegal (2007) found that participants who saw fear-
inducing pictures rated supraliminal sounds as louder. Our findings 
thus complement theirs, although we acknowledge that loudness (the 
psychological judgment of a sound’s intensity) and thresholds (the 
minimum intensity of a sound that is needed to trigger a conscious 
experience of the sound) are different concepts.  
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Figure 6. Plot of threshold against motivational orientation and tone valence 
for Study 4.5A (A) and 4.5B (B). Error bars represent standard errors. 
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Study 4.5B 
 Even though the conditioning procedure was strong enough to 
evoke an interesting main effect of valence on auditory threshold, the 
interaction with motivational orientation failed to reach significance. 
Perhaps, the latter interaction is only obtained when the sounds is 
strongly linked with a negative valence. Therefore, in Study 4.5B, we 
extended the conditioning procedure from by increasing the number of 
conditioning trials from 30 to 86. 
 
Participants 
We recruited 120 students (96 females) who participated in 
exchange for course credits or €5. Their mean age was 22.7 (SD = 4.9). 
 
Materials and Procedure 
 All materials and procedure were identical to Study 4.4, except 
that in this study, the conditioning trials were extended to 86 trials. 
  
Results 
No outliers were found in this study. The manipulation checks 
indicated that the manipulation of valence was successful: The 1000-Hz 
tones paired with positive pictures were rated more positively, t(122) = 
2.82, p = .006, whereas 1000-Hz tones paired with negative pictures 
were rated more negatively, t(122) = 4.01, p < .001. There were no 
changes in valence for the unconditioned 250 Hz and 4000 Hz tones 
(ps > .27).  
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A 2 (Motivational orientation: Approach vs Avoidance) × 2 
(Tone valence: Positive vs. Negative) with threshold as the dependent 
variable revealed a main effect of valence, F(1, 121) = 10.5, p = .002, η2 
= .07, and a main effect of motivational orientation, F(1, 121) = 7.47, p 
= .007, η2 = .06. However, there was no significant interaction, F(1, 121) 
= 2.44, p = .11, η2 = .02. Despite the nonsignificant interaction, it was 
justified to conduct planned contrasts because we made prior 
predictions about the pattern of results (see Study 4.5A). Our contrast 
revealed that when a tone was conditioned to be negative, participants 
in the avoidance condition have a lower threshold, F(1, 118) = 9.38, p 
= .003, compared to participants in the approach condition. However, 
when a tone was conditioned to be positive, threshold differences 
between avoidance and approach individuals disappeared, F(1, 118) = 
0.71, p = .35. Within the approach condition, tone valence did not 
produce a difference in threshold, F(1, 118) = 1.15 , p = .29. However, 
within the avoidant condition, the negatively conditioned tones 
produced a lower threshold than the positively conditioned tones, F(1, 
118) = 10.54, p = .002. See Figure 6.  
 
Discussion 
Our conditioning procedure appeared to successfully change the 
valence of the conditioned tones. In contrast to Study 4.5B, the 
evaluative ratings of the 1000Hz clearly changed in line with the 
unconditioned stimuli, both for the negative valence ratings and the 
positive valence ratings. More importantly, concerning our threshold 
results, the pattern of results thus suggests that when a signal is a safety 
cue, avoidant individuals no longer have an auditory detection 
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advantage for that particular signal. Hence, avoidant individuals have an 
auditory detection advantage for potentially threatening cues.  
 
Meta-analysis 
The studies thus far seemed to provide promising evidence for 
the influence for approach and avoidance orientations on auditory 
threshold. At the same time, the results were not consistently strong 
(e.g. Study 4.5A) and not always pointing in the same direction (e.g. 
Study 4.4 and Replication Study A). To find out how large this effect of 
avoidant motivational orientation on auditory threshold is, we 
performed a meta-analysis of all relevant studies on the threshold 
differences between approach and avoidance conditions. We selected 
only conditions that were relevant to our question and omitted 
conditions that were irrelevant (e.g., 250 Hz tones in Study 4.1, 
habituated 4000 Hz tones in Study 4.4, etc.). See Table 1 for a summary 
of relevant effect sizes.  
Because we had all primary data, we performed an individual 
participant data (IPD) meta-analysis (Cooper & Pattall, 2009). Our 
analysis revealed that avoidant individuals had a significantly lower 
auditory threshold, t(354) = 1.86, p = .05, d = .20. Because participants 
were nested within studies, we conducted multilevel modelling using 
restricted maximum likelihood estimation method (Snijders & Bosker, 
1999). In a random intercepts model, avoidant individuals had a lower 
auditory threshold, b = 2.27, SE = .80, t = 2.86, p = .005, 95% CI = [.71, 
3.84]. When the effect was allowed to vary between studies (i.e., 
random slopes model), there were no significant differences in 
threshold between the approach and avoidant individuals, b = 2.06, SE = 
2.17, t = .95, p = .38, 95% CI = [-3.45, 7.58]. Performing a conventional 
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aggregate data meta-analysis (Lipsey & Wilson, 2000) yielded similar 
conclusions: fixed effect d = .31 [.10, .52], p = .004, random effect d = .31 
[-.19, .80], p = .23.  
It is prudent to note the inconsistent confidence levels between 
the models, as well as the small sample of studies. The fixed effect 
model is appropriate for interpreting the robustness of the results in 
our collection of studies (Hedges & Vevea, 1998), and by that, it means 
that avoidant motivational orientation lowers auditory threshold within 
our studies. However, random effect models would be preferred when 
making inferences about future attempts (Hedges & Vevea, 1998).  
 
Table 1.  
Summary of Relevant Effect Sizes for the Meta-Analysis 
 Condition Sample size  
Study 1 2 n1 n2 d 
4.1 App-4000 Hz Av-4000 Hz 39 36 .68 
4.2 App-4000 Hz Av-4000 Hz 21 20 .84 
4.4 App-Novel Av-Novel 31 29 -.45 
4.5A App-Negative Av-Negative 37 32 .24 
4.5B App-Negative Av-Negative 31 28 .77 
Rep A App-4000 Hz Av-4000 Hz 27 27 -.42 
Note: A positive d means that avoidance individuals have a lower threshold. 
App: Approach; Av: Avoidance; Rep A: Replication A. 
 
General Discussion 
Our original hypothesis was that an avoidance motivational 
orientation would lower auditory thresholds in general. However, in 
both Studies 4.1 and 4.2, we found this to be true only for high 
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frequency sounds. Because high frequency sounds are rare and 
negatively valenced (Studies 4.3A and 4.3B), we further investigated 
whether rarity or valence of tone could result in avoidant individuals 
having lower threshold. We found no impact of motivational orientation 
on threshold when tone novelty was manipulated in Study 4.4. However, 
in Studies 4.5A, the pattern of results, though nonsignificant, suggested 
that avoidance individuals had a lower threshold when a neutral tone 
acquired a negative valence. With a stronger conditioning paradigm in 
Study 4.5B, this pattern was statistically significant. For approach 
individuals, tone valence did not affect their thresholds. Conceptually, 
these results suggest that an avoidance state improves one’s auditory 
detection capabilities for negative stimuli. The current literature has 
shown that fear and disgust lower visual and olfactory thresholds (Chan 
et al., in-press; Phelps et al. 2006; Sherman et al., 2012). Because fear 
and disgust are both avoidant emotions, our research has not only 
extended from visual and olfactory thresholds to auditory thresholds, 
but also suggests that an avoidance motivational orientation may be a 
more general mechanism that sharpens our senses.  
Several limitations should be mentioned. One, some of our 
studies may be underpowered. We calculated our sample size based on 
the first study we conducted (Study 4.1) where we obtained a large 
effect size with a large sample size. But subsequent studies had smaller 
effect sizes, such that the overall the effect size is small. One reason 
could be that the particular avoidance manipulation we used (arm 
extension) produces a weak avoidance motivational orientation. 
Another reason could be that the nonspecific nature of an avoidance 
motivational orientation expectedly produced a smaller effect size. It is 
possible that stronger effects could be obtained if other ways of 
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manipulating avoidance were used (e.g., prevention-focused 
instructions) or specific avoidant emotions (e.g., fear or disgust) were 
primed. Nevertheless, our results are fully consistent with the effects of 
avoidant emotions, such as fear and disgust in other domains of 
perceptual threshold (Chan et al., in-press; Phelps et al. 2006; Sherman 
et al., 2012). Two, we attempted to rule out the novelty explanation by 
manipulating tone novelty in Study 4.4 but the evidence was 
inconclusive. In retrospect, it is difficult to test the novelty explanation 
because of the way thresholds are measured. All reliable threshold 
measurements (staircase paradigms, sequential testing, maximum 
likelihood procedures; Soranzo & Grassi, 2014) require multiple 
exposures to the auditory stimuli during an experimental setting. Hence 
the measurement of auditory threshold itself already makes the stimuli 
not novel anymore. 
Readers should note that by international convention, the 
threshold for 1000 Hz tones is fixed at 0 dB, and the thresholds of 250 
Hz to 4000 Hz tones ranges from 15 dB to -5 dB (Robinson & Dadson, 
1956). Our obtained threshold values are far from these values 
probably because the international readings were obtained in a closed 
field (using insert earphones, sound-attenuated chambers), whereas 
ours were obtained using normal earphones in a non-sound-attenuated 
chamber. Our threshold values also varied from study to study, because 
of the difference in ambient room noise. Therefore, one should not take 
the threshold values of any particular study as the standard for 
comparison with other studies, either our own or others’; the important 
contrast is the relative difference between experimental groups within 
each study. 
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 Sounds convey unique ecological signals that other signals 
cannot convey. For example, because light travels in a straight line but 
sound bends around corners, one can hear threats coming even if the 
threat is out of sight. More pertinent to our research, mean threshold 
differences can be meaningful understood as distance advantage. 
Although the mean threshold difference of 2.19 dB seem small (see 
Meta-analysis), at threshold level, this equates to a 0.22 detection 
advantage in distance for avoidance individuals’ (see Online 
Supplementary Materials for the derivation). In other words, avoidance 
individuals would be able to detect the sound made by one hissing 
snake at threshold level 10 m away, whereas approach individuals 
would detect the snake only when it is as near as 7.8 m. The additional 
2.2 meters could be life-saving.  
That humans interpret things in ways that are consistent with 
their motives (Balcetis & Lassiter, 2011) is not new as ample research 
has demonstrated that motivation affects various aspects of social 
cognition. At a lower level, some research has shown that motivation 
modulates attentional processes (Todd & Anderson, 2011). But before 
anything gets attended to, they must first be detected. Although stimuli 
characteristics undoubtedly play a major role in detection (Hirsh & 
Watson, 1996), this research showed that motivational orientation can 
influence even the very basic level of our sensory experience.  
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Appendix 
Here we disclose two failed replications. These were performed 
sequentially after Study 4.2. We computed our sample size (80% power) 
based on the effect size of Study 4.1. We ran Replication A (N = 54) in a 
sound-isolated chamber (ambient noise level = 29 dB) used primarily 
for music cognition experiments. In addition to standard lab computers, 
this chamber also had a drum set, grand piano, sofa, and ambient 
lighting – all of which we could not remove. Participants performed the 
approach or avoidance manipulations while their thresholds to 4000 Hz 
tones were measured. Avoidance individuals had higher thresholds (M 
= 16.05; SD = 4.75) than approach individuals (M = 13.64; SD = 6.57) but 
this difference was not significant, t(52) = 1.54, p = .12, η2 = .04. It is 
unclear whether the failed replication was because the ambient testing 
environment had influenced the motivational orientation manipulation. 
In Replication B (N = 48), we returned to our standard lab. The 
procedure was otherwise identical to Replication A. There were no 
differences between groups, t(46) = .29, η2 = .002. However, our means 
were bimodally distributed, with entirely no measurements falling 20 
decibels in between the modal peaks. We suspected that the bimodal 
distribution was caused by malfunctioning headsets because bimodal 
distributions are extremely rare in psychology, and the huge gap of 20 
decibels is extremely abnormal and absent in other experiments 
reported here. The cause is probably an equipment failure. We 
subsequently used our own headsets for latter experiments. 
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Figure A. Frequency distribution of decibels in Replication B. 
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Online Supplementary Material 
Distance advantage  
A difference in sound power also has a distance advantage. At 
sound level L and distance r, the formula relating sound power to 
distance is: 
𝐿2 = 𝐿1 − | 20 ∙ 𝑙𝑜𝑔
𝑟2
𝑟1
| 
Every doubling of distance results in a 6 dB difference. At threshold 
level, avoidance individuals’ detection advantage in distance is 0.22. In 
other words, avoidance individuals would be able to detect the sound 
made by one hissing snake at threshold level 1 m away, whereas 
approach individuals would detect the snake only when it is as near as 
0.78 m.  
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ENGLISH SUMMARY 
 
Most people have no problems seeing the letters on this page. 
Indeed human sensory systems are well-adapted to detect things within 
specific environments.  In some situations, however, one’s visual 
perceptual system may be stretched to its limits. For example, when the 
print is fading away, the letters becomes increasingly difficult to read, to 
the extent that it eventually becomes “invisible”. Without altering 
physical properties of the environment such as lighting conditions, will 
there be psychological states where extremely faint stimuli may become 
more detectable? In this dissertation, I argue that one’s motivational 
orientation is one such psychological state that can alter perceptual 
limits.  
Psychophysicists have mainly been concerned with 
understanding how the structural characteristics of a stimulus influence 
the perceptual detection. For decades, detection thresholds were 
thought to be independent from one’s motivational or emotional states. 
Indeed any research that tried to prove otherwise was accused of being 
“psychoanalytic”. Recently, this view has slowly shifted. Researchers 
have consistently found that fear, an avoidant emotion, improves 
contrast sensitivity, spatial resolution, and temporal resolution. 
However, these studies focused only on vision. In this dissertation, I 
extended this line of research to olfaction and audition. 
In Chapter 1, I present a framework on the influence of avoidant 
emotions on perceptual limits, boundaries placed on perception abilities. 
Perceptual threshold—the main focus of my research—is one of these 
limits. The main thrust of my argument is that avoidant emotions such 
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as fear and disgust are important for survival. One of the functions they 
serve is that they aid detection of things in our environment by shifting 
perceptual thresholds, allowing organisms to detect things they would 
otherwise have not been able to detect. However, I also cautioned 
against an overly simplistic generalization that avoidant emotions 
would influence all possible perceptual limits, based purely on 
evolutionary arguments. Any such proposition needs to consider what 
not only evolutionary functions of emotions, but also consider what 
functions perceptual systems serve, and the plausibility of the 
underlying neurobiological and neural mechanisms. 
In Chapter 2, I present empirical studies testing the influence of 
the avoidant emotions, fear and disgust, on olfactory detection 
thresholds. I presented stimuli that induced disgust (e.g., rotten food) or 
fear (e.g., weapon), while intermittently assessing their olfactory 
threshold. The key findings were that disgust and fear both lower 
sensory thresholds, especially for those who are highly prone to 
experience disgust in daily life (high disgust sensitivity). 
One limitation from the experiments reported in Chapter 2 is 
that I had used only n-butanol to assess olfactory thresholds. N-butanol 
incidentally has an unpleasant smell. Hence it is unclear whether 
disgust lowers olfactory thresholds because disgust influences general 
olfactory sensitivity, or because of the fit between the negative valence 
of the scent and disgust. The objective of Chapter 3 was to tease apart 
these two explanations. In Chapter 3, instead of using n-butanol, I also 
used a pleasant scent, phenylethanol (rose scent). The key result was 
that disgust lowered olfactory thresholds for both of these scents. 
Hence it appears that disgust influences general olfactory sensitivity. 
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In Chapter 4, I investigated whether inducing a general avoidant 
motivational orientation would influence perceptual limits, but this 
time in a different modality – audition. I found that when participants 
adopted an arm posture known to trigger an avoidant motivational 
orientation, their auditory thresholds were lowered compared to 
control participants who adopted an arm posture known to trigger an 
approach motivational orientation. This effect was only restricted to 
high frequency sound stimuli. Subsequent experiments showed that this 
was because high frequency sound stimuli had negative valence. 
In conclusion, the theoretical review outlined in Chapter 1 
brings new insights on how avoidant emotions enhances perceptual 
limits and charts new directions on how to conceptualize the functional 
role of avoidant emotions vis-à-vis the functional role of sensory 
systems. Chapters 2 – 4 extended previous research from vision to 
olfaction and audition which previous research has not examined. 
Together, this dissertation has advanced our understanding on what it 
means to say that avoidant emotions enhance perception. 
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NEDERLANDSE SAMENVATTING 
 
De meeste mensen ervaren geen moeite met het lezen van de 
letters op deze pagina. Onze sensorische systemen zijn dan ook goed 
aangepast om dingen te detecteren in specifieke omgevingen. Echter, in 
sommige situaties komt het voor dat ons visuele perceptuele systeem 
tot aan zijn grenzen wordt getest. Bijvoorbeeld wanneer de inkt steeds 
dunner wordt, waardoor de letters steeds moeilijker leesbaar worden, 
tot aan het moment dat de letters uiteindelijk ‘onzichtbaar’ worden. Als 
de fysieke eigenschappen van de omgeving (zoals lichtomstandigheden) 
gelijk blijven, zijn er dan psychologische staten waarin extreem zwakke 
stimuli beter detecteerbaar zijn? In dit proefschrift beargumenteer ik 
dat differentiële motivationele oriëntaties dergelijke psychologische 
staten zijn die perceptuele grenzen kunnen beïnvloeden. 
Psychofysici hebben zich vooral bezig gehouden met het 
begrijpen van hoe de structurele kenmerken van een stimulus perceptie 
beïnvloeden. Gedurende decennia werd gedacht dat detectiedrempels 
onafhankelijk waren van motivationele of emotionele staten. Onderzoek 
dat probeerde deze link aan te tonen werd afgedaan als zijnde 
‘psychoanalytisch’. Sinds kort is deze gedachte langzaam aan het 
veranderen. Onderzoekers hebben vastgesteld dat angst, een 
‘vermijdende’ emotie, de contrastgevoeligheid en de resolutie van 
ruimte en tijd verbetert. Deze set van studies richtte zich echter 
uitsluitend op visuele perceptie. In dit proefschrift heb ik deze lijn van 
onderzoek uitgebreid naar reuk- en hoorvermogen. 
In Hoofdstuk 1 heb ik een kader geschetst over de invloed van 
vermijdende emoties op perceptuele grenzen. De perceptuele 
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drempel—de belangrijkste focus van mijn onderzoek—is een van die 
grenzen. Het belangrijkste onderdeel van mijn argumentatie is dat 
vermijdende emoties zoals angst of afkeer belangrijk zijn om te 
overleven. Een van de belangrijkste functies van vermijdende emoties is 
het in staat stellen perceptuele drempels te veranderen, waardoor 
organismen dingen kunnen waarnemen die zij anders niet zouden 
kunnen waarnemen. Ik was mij er wel van bewust dat ik niet een te 
simplistische generalisatie zou maken; dat vermijdende emoties alle 
mogelijke perceptuele grenzen zouden beïnvloeden, uitsluitend 
gebaseerd op evolutionaire argumentatie. Elk dergelijk voorstel moet 
overwegen waartoe niet alleen evolutionaire functies van emoties 
dienen, maar ook waartoe functies van perceptuele systemen dienen, 
evenals de plausibiliteit van de onderliggende neurobiologische en 
neurale mechanismen. 
In Hoofdstuk 2 heb ik een aantal empirische studies beschreven 
die de invloed van vermijdende emoties, angst en afkeer, testen op 
drempels van reukvermogen. Ik stelde proefpersonen bloot aan 
afbeeldingen die afkeer (bijvoorbeeld rottend voedsel) of angst 
(bijvoorbeeld een wapen) veroorzaakten terwijl ik de drempels van hun 
reukvermogen testte. De belangrijkste bevindingen waren dat zowel 
angst als afkeer resulteerden in lagere sensorische drempelwaarden, 
vooral voor diegenen die zeer gevoelig zijn voor het ervaren van afkeer 
in het dagelijkse leven (mensen met een hoge ‘afkeer-sensitiviteit’). 
Een beperking van de in Hoofdstuk 2 gerapporteerde studies is 
dat n-butanol werd gebruikt om drempels van reukvermogen te 
beoordelen. N-butanol heeft namelijk een enigszins onaangename geur. 
Vandaar dat het onduidelijk was of afkeer de drempels van 
reukvermogen verlaagt óf omdat afkeer de gevoeligheid van het 
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reukvermogen beïnvloedt, óf door de match tussen de negatieve 
valentie van de geur en de emotionele staat van afkeer. Het doel van 
Hoofdstuk 3 was om deze twee verklaringen te onderscheiden. In 
Hoofdstuk 3 heb ik in plaats van n-butanol ook een aangename geur 
(fenylethanol, ofwel rozengeur) gebruikt. Het belangrijkste resultaat 
was dat afkeer de drempels van reukvermogen voor beide geuren 
verlaagde. Dit duidt aan dat afkeer de algemene gevoeligheid van ons 
reukvermogen beïnvloedt. 
In Hoofdstuk 4 onderzocht ik of het induceren van een 
motivationele vermijdingsoriëntatie perceptuele grenzen zou 
beïnvloeden; dit keer in een andere modaliteit, namelijk hoorvermogen. 
Ik ontdekte dat bij deelnemers die een armhouding aannamen die 
bekend staat om het veroorzaken van een motivationele 
vermijdingsoriëntatie, auditieve drempels lager waren. Dit, in 
vergelijking met deelnemers die een armhouding aannamen die bekend 
staan om het veroorzaken van een motivationele 
toenaderingsoriëntatie. Dit effect beperkte zich tot geluidsstimuli met 
een hoge frequentie. Vervolgonderzoek toonde aan dat dit was omdat 
de geluidsstimuli met een hoge frequentie een negatieve valentie 
hadden. 
Concluderend, het theoretisch kader dat ik in Hoofdstuk 1 heb 
geschetst brengt nieuw inzicht in hoe vermijdende emotionele staten de 
perceptuele grenzen verbeteren. Daarnaast beschrijft het nieuwe 
richtlijnen over hoe de functionele rol van vermijdende emoties kan 
worden geconceptualiseerd in relatie tot de functionele rol van 
sensorische systemen. De hoofdstukken 2 tot en met 4 verbreden de 
scope van eerder onderzoek van het visuele domein naar reuk- en 
hoorvermogen, twee domeinen die nog niet eerder op een dergelijke 
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manier zijn onderzocht. Kortom, dit proefschrift verbreedt onze kennis 
over wat het betekent dat vermijdende emotionele staten de perceptie 
verbeteren. 
 
Translated by Dr. Maikel Hengstler 
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